I'm seeing in my attempts to describe the feeling between people in there, the openness, the air, the unguarded friendliness, I'm describing Selma. She is cause for a celebration of Fidel Castro in Sparta for Selma's mother leaving with her when she was 7. But for Fidel, Selma would not have come to Sparta. Thank you, Fidel. We can tell Jesse Helms that Fidel was good for something.
Leer el resto en: http://airbellowsanalog.blogspot.com/2010/12/day-in-coffee-shop.html
Friday, December 31, 2010
Thursday, December 30, 2010
Denuncia del gulag en tiempos de Wikileaks
Foto del diario El Mundo
29 DIC 2010 13:11
El inspector Erlendur Sveinsson es uno de los antihéroes más atractivos que ha dado la literatura policiaca del norte de Europa. Su creador, el islandés Arlandur Indridason, le retuerce en cada nueva novela para ponerle en una situación cada vez más desesperada. En ‘El hombre del lago’ –la cuarta entrega publicada en España–, Erlendur vive con las persianas bajadas permanentemente en una casa que visita de manera esporádica su hijo, Sindri –una especie de vagabundo sin oficio ni beneficio–, y a la que ya nunca va la desahuciada Eva Lind, la hija yonqui del policía, que sigue obsesionado con la desaparición de su hermano, ocurrida cuando él era un niño.
En las anteriores entregas –‘Las marismas’, ‘La Voz’ y la exitosa ‘La mujer de verde’–, el talento investigador de Erlendur y los suyos ocupaban la mayor parte de los libros, que seguían un clásico esquema de novela policiaca. En ‘El hombre del lago’, en cambio, Indridason se esfuerza por presentar a su antihéroe como un tipo casi acabado, con una amante casada como único hilo de afecto con el resto de la sociedad y con su equipo acuciado por problemas personales y diferencias casi insalvables entre ellos. Esta descomposición del protagonista y su entorno crece paralela a una historia ocurrida 60 años atrás, en plena guerra fría, que se une con el hallazgo de un cadáver en un lago, punto de arranque de la novela y de la investigación de Erlendur.
LEER EL RESTO
Wednesday, December 29, 2010
WikiCuba: El Vaticano detras del canje de los 5 espias.
No hay duda que el interlocutor de Castro en Estados Unidos con relacion al canje de los 5 espias presos en Estados Unidos es el Vaticano de acuerdo a este cable.
La informacion, transmitida el 4 de abril de 2009, se basa en una reunion del Diputado en Jefe de la Mision de Estados Unidos en Cuba con el oficial a cargo de las relaciones con los paises caribenos y andinos de la Santa Sede, el Monsenor Angelo Accattino. Estos parrafos son reveladores, especialmente acerca de la reduccion del costo de las remesas que exigia Estados Unidos en esa reunion, y que hace unos dias anunciara el regimen de Castro, hasta la "posibilidad intrigante del Vaticano acerca de un canje de los 5 espias por disidentes presos en Cuba" para mejorar las relaciones y su seguimiento a la apelacion a la Corte Suprema en el caso de los 5 espias. ?Que habra discutido el Cardenal Alomio -Alamino- en su viaje el pasado Junio, reuniendose con legisladores en Washington, casualmente el mismo mes que la Corte Suprema desestimo el caso? Leyendo este cable tendremos una idea mas precisa de lo que se estaba cocinando en el Vaticano entonces y se esta sirviendo ahora. Es importante, leer estos parrafos en el contexto actual de los acontecimientos.
"¶2. (C) CDA and Acting DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission) on April 22 called on the Holy See’s official in charge of relations with Caribbean and Andean countries, Msgr. Angelo Accattino, to review recent developments in the region. As he had done previously (ref c), Accattino warmly welcomed recent White House policy decisions on Cuba and reviewed with interest the White House Fact Sheet on “Reaching Out to the Cuban People†which CDA gave him. Accattino also noted favorably Raul Castro’s comments that Cuba was prepared to talk to the U.S. about all topics - although “after all, he has no other options anymore.†CDA said Castro would need to reciprocate the moves from Washington with more than words - he needed to take action on political prisoners or reduce the cost of receiving remittances in Cuba."
¶3. (C) Accattino said the Vatican considered intriguing the possibility of a swap of political prisoners in Cuba for the “Cuban Five†in jail in the U.S. ADCM protested that their circumstances were not parallel, as the Cuban Five were convicted spies and the prisoners in Cuba were dissidents. Accattino quickly agreed but said discussions that led to the release of the dissidents were worth pursuing regardless. The Holy See was also following the Supreme Court appeal by the Cuban Five, to see how that might affect relations between the U.S. and Cuba. As an interim measure, Accattino suggested that the U.S. allow a jail visit by the wives of two of the five Cuban spies. CDA again noted that the U.S. had taken the first step, now the Cuban government needed to reciprocate in a concrete way.
La informacion, transmitida el 4 de abril de 2009, se basa en una reunion del Diputado en Jefe de la Mision de Estados Unidos en Cuba con el oficial a cargo de las relaciones con los paises caribenos y andinos de la Santa Sede, el Monsenor Angelo Accattino. Estos parrafos son reveladores, especialmente acerca de la reduccion del costo de las remesas que exigia Estados Unidos en esa reunion, y que hace unos dias anunciara el regimen de Castro, hasta la "posibilidad intrigante del Vaticano acerca de un canje de los 5 espias por disidentes presos en Cuba" para mejorar las relaciones y su seguimiento a la apelacion a la Corte Suprema en el caso de los 5 espias. ?Que habra discutido el Cardenal Alomio -Alamino- en su viaje el pasado Junio, reuniendose con legisladores en Washington, casualmente el mismo mes que la Corte Suprema desestimo el caso? Leyendo este cable tendremos una idea mas precisa de lo que se estaba cocinando en el Vaticano entonces y se esta sirviendo ahora. Es importante, leer estos parrafos en el contexto actual de los acontecimientos.
"¶2. (C) CDA and Acting DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission) on April 22 called on the Holy See’s official in charge of relations with Caribbean and Andean countries, Msgr. Angelo Accattino, to review recent developments in the region. As he had done previously (ref c), Accattino warmly welcomed recent White House policy decisions on Cuba and reviewed with interest the White House Fact Sheet on “Reaching Out to the Cuban People†which CDA gave him. Accattino also noted favorably Raul Castro’s comments that Cuba was prepared to talk to the U.S. about all topics - although “after all, he has no other options anymore.†CDA said Castro would need to reciprocate the moves from Washington with more than words - he needed to take action on political prisoners or reduce the cost of receiving remittances in Cuba."
¶3. (C) Accattino said the Vatican considered intriguing the possibility of a swap of political prisoners in Cuba for the “Cuban Five†in jail in the U.S. ADCM protested that their circumstances were not parallel, as the Cuban Five were convicted spies and the prisoners in Cuba were dissidents. Accattino quickly agreed but said discussions that led to the release of the dissidents were worth pursuing regardless. The Holy See was also following the Supreme Court appeal by the Cuban Five, to see how that might affect relations between the U.S. and Cuba. As an interim measure, Accattino suggested that the U.S. allow a jail visit by the wives of two of the five Cuban spies. CDA again noted that the U.S. had taken the first step, now the Cuban government needed to reciprocate in a concrete way.
Tuesday, December 28, 2010
Lagartos en "la tarde se mueve"
H M Lagarde, el "siempre Roboilusionario (con mayusculas ha de leerse) al estilo de Silvito, y defensor del Socio-lismo criollo, esta en Miami, y nada menos que con Inmundito Garcia, otro del mismo talante, en su programita pituitario "La Tarde se Mueve" que antes era la Noche se Mueve" en la WQBA, de donde lo botaron y que no es mas que una guarida de castristas frustados.
Hasta la "supuesta" agente de Castro en Miami, Silvia Wilhelm le pagaba el programita, segun su propia confesion en el caso Wilhelm vs Simmons, donde curiosamente, admitia, que hasta cenaba en Cuba con "Pancho" Aruka, otro patrocinador del gordito Inmundo, quien a la vez, (Aruka) cuando Silvia Wilhelm necesito de un abogado para defenderse de las acusaciones de "difamacion" que Simmons habia dicho el el programa A Mano Limpia, , le recomendo un buen abogado. Ella retiro el caso a tiempo, cuando sus cuentas bancarias en el Coconut Bank iban ser reveladas. Y a su vez admitio que uno de los primeros en comunicarse con ella el dia de las acusaciones de Simmons, era "Dirty" Joe Garcia, de la otrora fundacion y el creador del programita de Inmundo, segun un aliado de Joe en su campana. Nada, Dios los cria y el diablo los junta.
Ver foto y nota en el Blog de Yoandry
Hasta la "supuesta" agente de Castro en Miami, Silvia Wilhelm le pagaba el programita, segun su propia confesion en el caso Wilhelm vs Simmons, donde curiosamente, admitia, que hasta cenaba en Cuba con "Pancho" Aruka, otro patrocinador del gordito Inmundo, quien a la vez, (Aruka) cuando Silvia Wilhelm necesito de un abogado para defenderse de las acusaciones de "difamacion" que Simmons habia dicho el el programa A Mano Limpia, , le recomendo un buen abogado. Ella retiro el caso a tiempo, cuando sus cuentas bancarias en el Coconut Bank iban ser reveladas. Y a su vez admitio que uno de los primeros en comunicarse con ella el dia de las acusaciones de Simmons, era "Dirty" Joe Garcia, de la otrora fundacion y el creador del programita de Inmundo, segun un aliado de Joe en su campana. Nada, Dios los cria y el diablo los junta.
Ver foto y nota en el Blog de Yoandry
WikiBama: ?Ayuda humanitaria secreta a Cuba y canje de espias?
Por Juan Cuellar
Las relaciones entre Obama y Castro parecen ser mas amplias de lo que se ha informado publicamente. La administracion de Obama, al parecer, segun reportes secretos en WikiLeaks de la Seccion de Intereses en Cuba, ha discutido mas temas que la repatriacion de los balseros, el trafico ilegal de cubanos y el de drogas.
Acorde a los documentos, se han discutido desde "terrorismo, levantamiento del embargo, levantamiento de las restricciones de viajes a Cuba, hasta ayuda humanitaria por devastaciones de huracanes secretas y el canje de sus 5 espias encarcelados en EE.UU.
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/09/09HAVANA559.html
Comment: DIS was extremely surprised by the hurricane assistance-related comments made by the MINREX
officer. Having spent a significant amount of time working and traveling with Cuban MININT and MINREX officers over the past year, Cubans are extremely proud people, and almost never admit that there is a flaw in their system, even when
the flaw is a glaring one. For a MINREX officer to admit that his country may be willing to accept assistance from the
U.S. should a hurricane ravage this island again, ventures well beyond the perceived pride level of GOC officials. More
than anything, the GOC does not like to be embarrassed, and taking handouts from the USG may well be a point of
embarrassment for the GOC should they choose to accept. As such, any genuine post-hurricane assistance offer should be extended quietly; however, the USG should be wary that the GOC may be expecting a blank check, not a calculated offer of pragmatic post-hurricane assistance. End Comment. "
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/06/09HAVANA341.html: "However, the topic was brushed over, and Bencomo reiterated his past message that the GOC is also interested in engaging in talks on 3 additional topics: counterdrug, counterterrorism, and natural disaster response and preparation"........... "Recollecting an earlier conversation in which he stated that, although the U.S. had made some recent overtures towards the GOC, Bencomo stated that the U.S. could take "heavier" steps to change the nature of the relationship. DIS asked Bencomo why he believed migration talks and the other three topics mentioned above were so important if the GOC was so interested in seeing "heavier" changes. He stated that the aforementioned forums for engagement are a launching point, or segue, to further talks on larger issues, which we believe include the embargo, Guantanamo Bay, and the five Cuban spies."
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/12/09HAVANA726.html (C) Ambassador Cacho said he had been asked that morning XXXXXXXXXXXX to demarche the GOC to ask that they be allowed to visit their imprisoned relatives on Christmas Day as a humanitarian gesture. He was prepared to do so but was skeptical he would obtain a positive response. The ambassador asked if Perez O,Conor and Salanueva, wives of two of the Cuban Five, would receive visas to visit their husbands. COM described the history of their ineligibilities and the differences between the two cases. The ambassador noted the GOC,s interest in swapping the Cuban FIVE for political prisoners in Cuba. COM responded that the vast majority of the Damas and their imprisoned relatives were opposed to any such offer.
El hecho de que las discusiones con la Habana, relacionadas a la inmigracion, llegue al punto de discutirse la liberacion de los cinco espias asesinos tal vez hizo que Castro anunciara pomposamente su liberacion en estas Navidades, resulta demasiado coincidental. En otro WikiLeaks, el Jefe de la Seccion de Intereses en Cuba, Jonathan Farrar mencionaba los deseos de Cuba en negociar el canje de sus espias, a lo que el funcionario norteamericano agregaba que Las Damas de Blanco se oponian a tal medida: ?Tendra algo que ver la division fomentada por la Iglesia en Cuba de Las Damas de Blanco y la resistencia de Castro en soltar a los 11 restantes? ?Seran 5 miserables por 11 justos?
Para mi es alarmante tambien que la administracion de Obama contemple enviarle dinero a Cuba secretamente en ayuda humanitaria bajo las condiciones de Castro. Una investigacion Congresional deberia llevarse a Cabo al respecto. Es inmoral que en cuestiones de inmigracion, se ventilen subsidios humanitarios por debajo de la mesa al antojo del regimen y se considere el canje de espias castristas por hombres inocentes. El nuevo Comitee de Relaciones Exteriores del Congreso deberia exigir una respuesta a tales maniobras.
Que estaran planeando los Castros con la nuevas declaraciones de Gerardo Hernandez, el unico espia condenado por el vil asesinato de Armando Alejandre, Jr., Carlos Costa, Mario de la Pena, y Pablo Morales.
?Una promesa de Obama ante uno de sus jueces o un perdon al final de su mandato, como hizo Clinton con los Macheteros? y, ?Tiene algo que ver todo esto de "colaboracion contra el terrorismo" que Castro desea con el nuevo giro judicial que ha tomado el caso de Posada Carriles?
Leyendo los documentos de WikiLeaks y viendo el desenvolvimiento en el Departamento de Justicia de Obama, no lo
dudaria.
Las relaciones entre Obama y Castro parecen ser mas amplias de lo que se ha informado publicamente. La administracion de Obama, al parecer, segun reportes secretos en WikiLeaks de la Seccion de Intereses en Cuba, ha discutido mas temas que la repatriacion de los balseros, el trafico ilegal de cubanos y el de drogas.
Acorde a los documentos, se han discutido desde "terrorismo, levantamiento del embargo, levantamiento de las restricciones de viajes a Cuba, hasta ayuda humanitaria por devastaciones de huracanes secretas y el canje de sus 5 espias encarcelados en EE.UU.
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/09/09HAVANA559.html
Comment: DIS was extremely surprised by the hurricane assistance-related comments made by the MINREX
officer. Having spent a significant amount of time working and traveling with Cuban MININT and MINREX officers over the past year, Cubans are extremely proud people, and almost never admit that there is a flaw in their system, even when
the flaw is a glaring one. For a MINREX officer to admit that his country may be willing to accept assistance from the
U.S. should a hurricane ravage this island again, ventures well beyond the perceived pride level of GOC officials. More
than anything, the GOC does not like to be embarrassed, and taking handouts from the USG may well be a point of
embarrassment for the GOC should they choose to accept. As such, any genuine post-hurricane assistance offer should be extended quietly; however, the USG should be wary that the GOC may be expecting a blank check, not a calculated offer of pragmatic post-hurricane assistance. End Comment. "
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/06/09HAVANA341.html: "However, the topic was brushed over, and Bencomo reiterated his past message that the GOC is also interested in engaging in talks on 3 additional topics: counterdrug, counterterrorism, and natural disaster response and preparation"........... "Recollecting an earlier conversation in which he stated that, although the U.S. had made some recent overtures towards the GOC, Bencomo stated that the U.S. could take "heavier" steps to change the nature of the relationship. DIS asked Bencomo why he believed migration talks and the other three topics mentioned above were so important if the GOC was so interested in seeing "heavier" changes. He stated that the aforementioned forums for engagement are a launching point, or segue, to further talks on larger issues, which we believe include the embargo, Guantanamo Bay, and the five Cuban spies."
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/12/09HAVANA726.html (C) Ambassador Cacho said he had been asked that morning XXXXXXXXXXXX to demarche the GOC to ask that they be allowed to visit their imprisoned relatives on Christmas Day as a humanitarian gesture. He was prepared to do so but was skeptical he would obtain a positive response. The ambassador asked if Perez O,Conor and Salanueva, wives of two of the Cuban Five, would receive visas to visit their husbands. COM described the history of their ineligibilities and the differences between the two cases. The ambassador noted the GOC,s interest in swapping the Cuban FIVE for political prisoners in Cuba. COM responded that the vast majority of the Damas and their imprisoned relatives were opposed to any such offer.
El hecho de que las discusiones con la Habana, relacionadas a la inmigracion, llegue al punto de discutirse la liberacion de los cinco espias asesinos tal vez hizo que Castro anunciara pomposamente su liberacion en estas Navidades, resulta demasiado coincidental. En otro WikiLeaks, el Jefe de la Seccion de Intereses en Cuba, Jonathan Farrar mencionaba los deseos de Cuba en negociar el canje de sus espias, a lo que el funcionario norteamericano agregaba que Las Damas de Blanco se oponian a tal medida: ?Tendra algo que ver la division fomentada por la Iglesia en Cuba de Las Damas de Blanco y la resistencia de Castro en soltar a los 11 restantes? ?Seran 5 miserables por 11 justos?
Para mi es alarmante tambien que la administracion de Obama contemple enviarle dinero a Cuba secretamente en ayuda humanitaria bajo las condiciones de Castro. Una investigacion Congresional deberia llevarse a Cabo al respecto. Es inmoral que en cuestiones de inmigracion, se ventilen subsidios humanitarios por debajo de la mesa al antojo del regimen y se considere el canje de espias castristas por hombres inocentes. El nuevo Comitee de Relaciones Exteriores del Congreso deberia exigir una respuesta a tales maniobras.
Que estaran planeando los Castros con la nuevas declaraciones de Gerardo Hernandez, el unico espia condenado por el vil asesinato de Armando Alejandre, Jr., Carlos Costa, Mario de la Pena, y Pablo Morales.
?Una promesa de Obama ante uno de sus jueces o un perdon al final de su mandato, como hizo Clinton con los Macheteros? y, ?Tiene algo que ver todo esto de "colaboracion contra el terrorismo" que Castro desea con el nuevo giro judicial que ha tomado el caso de Posada Carriles?
Leyendo los documentos de WikiLeaks y viendo el desenvolvimiento en el Departamento de Justicia de Obama, no lo
dudaria.
Los Castro, los dos cabecillas principales de los secuestradores de Cuba, continúan siendo encausables.
Por Dr. Octavio Dilewis Ibarra-Tamayo
La confesión del sicario castrista Gerardo Hernández agrega soporte a la acusación contra los Castro de haber asesinado (con premeditación y alevosía) a Armando, Pablo, Mario y Carlos, y de haberlo hecho en espacio aéreo internacional, contra naves de bandera norteamericana, es decir, en territorio norteamericano. Sin embargo, el gobierno
estadounidense, desde Clinton, Bush, hasta Obama, continúa prevaricando, cruzado de brazos, y permitiendo que los Castro se mantengan por encima de la ley en Estados Unidos, contra todo lo que indica la constitución norteamericana, la decencia y el espíritu de justicia.
LEER EL RESTO
La confesión del sicario castrista Gerardo Hernández agrega soporte a la acusación contra los Castro de haber asesinado (con premeditación y alevosía) a Armando, Pablo, Mario y Carlos, y de haberlo hecho en espacio aéreo internacional, contra naves de bandera norteamericana, es decir, en territorio norteamericano. Sin embargo, el gobierno
estadounidense, desde Clinton, Bush, hasta Obama, continúa prevaricando, cruzado de brazos, y permitiendo que los Castro se mantengan por encima de la ley en Estados Unidos, contra todo lo que indica la constitución norteamericana, la decencia y el espíritu de justicia.
LEER EL RESTO
Monday, December 27, 2010
KGB, el acrónimo que sobrevivió en Bielorrusia a la caída del Comunismo
KGB, el acrónimo que sobrevivió en Bielorrusia a la caída del Comunismo
Ignacio Ortega Moscú, 25 dic (EFE).- KGB, un acrónimo que aún produce escalofríos en todo el mundo, sobrevivió a la caída del Comunismo y resiste el paso del tiempo en Bielorrusia, el último bastión de la máquina de represión estalinista.
"El objetivo del KGB es garantizar la seguridad de los ciudadanos, la sociedad y el Estado", señala la página web (www.kgb.by) del Comité de Seguridad Nacional bielorruso.
No obstante, ese organismo es en realidad el brazo armado del último dictador de Europa, el presidente bielorruso Alexandr Lukashenko, que lo utiliza para controlar a su población y reprimir a la disidencia política.
Ignacio Ortega Moscú, 25 dic (EFE).- KGB, un acrónimo que aún produce escalofríos en todo el mundo, sobrevivió a la caída del Comunismo y resiste el paso del tiempo en Bielorrusia, el último bastión de la máquina de represión estalinista.
"El objetivo del KGB es garantizar la seguridad de los ciudadanos, la sociedad y el Estado", señala la página web (www.kgb.by) del Comité de Seguridad Nacional bielorruso.
No obstante, ese organismo es en realidad el brazo armado del último dictador de Europa, el presidente bielorruso Alexandr Lukashenko, que lo utiliza para controlar a su población y reprimir a la disidencia política.
Sunday, December 26, 2010
El exiliado
El cubano exiliado nunca desmiente o calla su experiencia para inventarse otra. El esta dispuesto a luchar contra el comunismo y sus aliados, hasta la muerte, por cualquier camino, a cada paso, en cada oportunidad; a flor de labio o bajo el azote secuaz de su enemigo . El exiliado lleva el corazon -de la historia viva- en el pecho junto a sus heridas ante el espejo del tiempo para nunca despedirse del dolor suyo o el ajeno. El no emigra el alma. El no muere en el silencio ni muda su lengua.
El que callo por miedo alla, y aca lo saca de su pecho para siempre y lo desprecia: exiliado es, a diferencia de aquel que lo mismo calla aqui, alla y aculla: el tipico pusilanime, oportunista y vividor, que aprendio a taparse la boca para conservar sus dientes. Ese odia ser exiliado y se suma al verdugo.
El exiliado no renuncia ni reniega su procedencia, no se desvanece, no ayuda al victimario. El mira con el corazon de la historia sin temblarle la mirada, sin vendas ni tapujos, el ve y se deja ver, no oculta nada a si mismo. El procura, discierne, vigila, defiende, mientras los demas inventan, resuelven, justifican. ?No nos dice el proverbio que ve mas el que esta afuera que el de adentro? Cuanto mas puede ver el que se mantiene en ambos lados. ?no es acaso suficiente los ojos del tiempo para ver las cosas como son?
El verdadero exiliado se rebela, sale a la calle: marcha, grita, llora, vocifera. No necita diccionarios para definir su enciclopedia ni teatros para presentar su obra. Hace lo mismo en una esquina, en un semaforo o en medio de una carretera, en una cafeteria, un restaurante, un salon de espera, como en un cine, un concierto, un periodico, una estacion de radio, un canal de television y una reunion academica; lo mismo parado que sentado, comiendo o bebiendo, despierto o dormido. El exiliado es intrasigente como Marti y bueno como Varela.
El exiliado nunca se da por vencido, ni la derrota misma puede cambiarle su condicion. El sabe que al final del camino, cuando se cierren sus ojos y su boca calle, su eco retumbara las montanas del tiempo como una dulce campana de esperanza.
El vive para morir antes de vivir muerto.
El que callo por miedo alla, y aca lo saca de su pecho para siempre y lo desprecia: exiliado es, a diferencia de aquel que lo mismo calla aqui, alla y aculla: el tipico pusilanime, oportunista y vividor, que aprendio a taparse la boca para conservar sus dientes. Ese odia ser exiliado y se suma al verdugo.
El exiliado no renuncia ni reniega su procedencia, no se desvanece, no ayuda al victimario. El mira con el corazon de la historia sin temblarle la mirada, sin vendas ni tapujos, el ve y se deja ver, no oculta nada a si mismo. El procura, discierne, vigila, defiende, mientras los demas inventan, resuelven, justifican. ?No nos dice el proverbio que ve mas el que esta afuera que el de adentro? Cuanto mas puede ver el que se mantiene en ambos lados. ?no es acaso suficiente los ojos del tiempo para ver las cosas como son?
El verdadero exiliado se rebela, sale a la calle: marcha, grita, llora, vocifera. No necita diccionarios para definir su enciclopedia ni teatros para presentar su obra. Hace lo mismo en una esquina, en un semaforo o en medio de una carretera, en una cafeteria, un restaurante, un salon de espera, como en un cine, un concierto, un periodico, una estacion de radio, un canal de television y una reunion academica; lo mismo parado que sentado, comiendo o bebiendo, despierto o dormido. El exiliado es intrasigente como Marti y bueno como Varela.
El exiliado nunca se da por vencido, ni la derrota misma puede cambiarle su condicion. El sabe que al final del camino, cuando se cierren sus ojos y su boca calle, su eco retumbara las montanas del tiempo como una dulce campana de esperanza.
El vive para morir antes de vivir muerto.
Saturday, December 25, 2010
WikiCuba: Cuba derrocha y Venezuela paga.
Una vez mas se corrobora. Cuba depende, como un chulo, del dinero de su nueva prostituta -Venezuela-, para sufragar su existencia plebeya. No hablo de los regalos exuberantes que Venezuela le roba a su pueblo, para ponerlo a los pies de su jefe,hablo del "Cash-Efectivo". Todos los chulitos en Cuba esperan deseosos las maletas de Chavez. ?Hasta cuando durara el mana venezolano? Bueno, al criterio del diplomatico de Obama en Cuba, esta mermando. Al unico que le pagan a tiempo es a Los Estados Unidos y esto tiene consternado al resto del munsdo: No es justo que Cuba le pague a los "gringos" enseguida y ellos tengan que esperar por Chavez, no en balde estan desesperados por levantar las restricciones y asi sentirse menos envidiosos.Y todo gracias a la sabiduria de nuestros congresistas. Por eso han sido reelegidos.
Juan Cuellar
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RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DCC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 HAVANA 000322
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR WHA/CCA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2019
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL EFIN CU
SUBJECT: HOW MIGHT CUBA ENTER ANOTHER SPECIAL PERIOD?
REF: A. HAVANA 308
¶B. 06 HAVANA 8017
¶C. CARACAS 564
¶D. 07 HAVANA 761
Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) The combination of new warnings of potential
blackouts, serious liquidity issues, and potential (if not
already) reduced financial support from Venezuela has sparked
rumors on the street and in the international media that Cuba
may be headed toward another "Special Period". The reality
is that Cuba and Cubans are not as vulnerable as they were in
1989 before the end of Soviet subsidies. However, the Cuban
economy remains remarkably dependent on external markets and
access to credit. While the level of foreign reserves is a
well guarded secret, some analysts and USINT contacts believe
the GOC could run out of cash later this year without a
significant change of course. Energy austerity measures
officially began on June 1, starting with state companies and
then potentially moving to households. We expect a reduction
in non-fuel imports as a next step. End Summary
-----------------------------
Are We There Yet? No, But...
-----------------------------
¶2. (C) The standard of living for Cubans, while still not as
high as twenty years ago before the end of Soviet subsidies,
remains much better than the darkest days of the 1990 to 1993
period when GDP fell more than 35 percent. While we expect
zero to negative GDP growth in 2009 (Ref A), Cuba's latest
challenges have yet to seriously affect the average Cuban.
The GOC blames its current macroeconomic woes on the world
economic slowdown, the U.S. embargo, a particularly
destructive 2008 hurricane season, and general inefficiency
and waste. The GOC is quick to point out that no Cuban will
be evicted for failure to pay a mortgage and Cuban jobs
remain secure while rich countries are experiencing massive
layoffs. Nevertheless, the GOC has previewed other
difficulties that could soon reach Cuban households.
Liquidity Crunch
----------------
¶3. (C) Cuba has been in a perennial state of late-payment
for decades; sometimes due to legitimate cash shortages and
at other times simply as a negotiation tactic. Cuba has long
pointed to the crisis of the day to renegotiate short term
official debt, and we can not rule out that the GOC is simply
using the current world economic crisis to improve its cash
position. However, diplomatic contacts agree that Cuba's
current liquidity crunch is much deeper than in recent years.
Foreign companies are waiting three to six months to receive
payment, and some have already agreed to sell their assets
back to the GOC (Pebercan) or restructure their accounts
receivables (Sherritt) into medium to long term government
debt.
¶4. (C) The latest holdup appears to be at the banking level,
as Cuban state companies are reportedly making payments on
time but the payment transfers are delayed by the bank for
months before being released to the foreign enterprise.
Alternatively, the funds are deposited in the foreign
company's account for use within Cuba but they are not
permitted to transfer the funds abroad or into a foreign
currency. Initially, Cuban officials blamed the need to
divert resources to assist in the recovery from last year's
hurricanes, but now the main culprit appears to be the world
economic crisis. A reported collapse in all of Cuba's main
sources of foreign currency (nickel exports, tourism,
remittances) and an increase in the quantity and price of
Cuban imports have magnified an already increasing debt
burden. It is clear that the GOC is hemorrhaging cash.
Whether it has reached the crisis point or not is less clear.
Either way, the Cuban banking sector has lost much of the
credibility it had built in recent years, which has led some
HAVANA 00000322 002 OF 005
to speculate that long time Central Bank President Francisco
Soberon may finally be on his way out.
¶5. (C) CIMEX, Cuba's largest and most diversified holding
company, reported on May 20 that payments for some imports
have suffered delays, but the "will of the country" was to
meet its financial obligations. CIMEX also reported that
remittances were down so far in 2009. CIMEX controls Banco
Financiero International, the most important Cuban bank for
foreign trade related transactions, and the relationship with
remittance providers including Western Union and Canada's
Transcard through Financiera CIMEX. According to Reuters,
the GOC has called government ministries to cut spending by 6
percent and limit imports. European and Canadian diplomats
report reduced exports to Cuba so far this year, especially
for machinery and other non-food items. Ironically, and to
the visible dismay of our diplomatic colleagues, U.S. exports
to Cuba through the first quarter of 2009 were higher than
even last year's historic level. This dismay is heightened
by the fact that U.S. companies are paid on time while others
must wait as reported above. U.S. exports make up much of
the food consumed by Cubans and sold in the income generating
tourist industry, and U.S. law requires payment in cash in
advance. However, there are recent reports that Cuban
purchases of U.S. meat products have been cut through the
rest of 2009.
Threatened Blackouts
--------------------
¶6. (SBU) In 2005, Fidel Castro announced that his new Energy
Revolution would put a stop to blackouts in Cuba by the end
of 2006. The GOC took several measures over the next few
years to limit future blackouts (Ref B), including increasing
household electricity bills, swapping out refrigerators and
light bulbs, and importing hundreds of small generators.
Despite these steps, the official press announced on May 22
that "exceptional measures to save electricity shall be
applied throughout the country starting 1 June in an effort
to curb overconsumption, bring every center, municipality,
and province in line with their plan, and prevent power
cuts." The GOC identified 1,700 state enterprises as high
electricity users, 3,000 examples of waste in the public
sector, and four provinces with increasing home consumption.
The GOC is taking extreme measures to prevent countrywide
blackouts. A new austerity plan is being implemented by each
municipality and state enterprise to conserve energy. Local
energy councils are monitoring the daily use of electricity
and local authorities are conducting surprise inspections.
In the first few days of the new plan, provinces have been
strict in their stated intention to shut off a company's
electricity if it exceeds its budgeted allowance. There are
reports that the Holguin province shut off the electricity
for the offices and warehouses of the three nickel plants due
to overconsumption, although the plants themselves continue
to operate.
¶7. (SBU) Although households are not included in the formal
austerity program, the official press has highlighted fines
levied on residents caught rigging electricity meters, urged
personal energy savings, and threatened countrywide blackouts
if the situation doesn't improve. The summer 2005 blackouts
were a serious strain on Cuban households and the possibility
of a return to those days despite years of supposed reform in
the sector has clearly disappointed our Cuban contacts.
Frequent but short-lived power outages already take place on
a daily basis, but many Cubans refuse even to speculate on a
return to scheduled blackouts. Blackouts mean spoiled food,
no air conditioning during the brutal summer months, and no
cooking since the GOC recently swapped most gas stoves with
an electric version from China. According to GOC officials,
the root of this summer's energy crisis is not a lack of
generation capacity (as in 2005) but a shortage of fuel.
Cuba uses much of its own heavy crude oil for domestic
electricity production, but also relies on imports, in
particular Venezuelan deliveries of refined products to power
the (diesel) gas guzzling generators.
--------------------------------------------- ------------
Potential Triggers: Venezuela, Hurricanes, or Insolvency
--------------------------------------------- ------------
HAVANA 00000322 003 OF 005
¶8. (SBU) Venezuela: In addition to oil deliveries, Cuba and
Venezuelan oil conglomerate PDVSA have significant joint
ventures in Cuba, Venezuela, and other Petrocaribe countries.
Within Cuba, these ventures are focused on building and
expanding oil refining capacity, oil prospecting, gas
production, maritime transportation (crude oil and
byproducts), housing construction, agricultural production,
access to potable water, fishing, and transportation
services. Potential future operations include increasing
storage capabilities, enlarging cargo docks and navigation
channels, and constructing a network of pipelines, roads, and
services infrastructure. Venezuela has taken over from China
a joint venture to build a new nickel plant within three
years. In addition, Cuba and Venezuela are working on a
fiber optic cable with an ever changing completion date,
currently some time in 2010.
¶9. (C) The GOC started hinting that all was not rosy with
its economic relationship with Venezuela when, in an
unusually public display, the front page of the Communist
Party newspaper Granma reported on May 21 that Venezuela
would experience a 50 percent drop in petroleum revenue in
¶2009. The GOC reference to a lack of fuel rather than
generation capacity to explain energy shortages could
indicate either a reduction (or delay) in fuel supplies from
Venezuela or disappointing refining results through the
Cuba/PDVSA joint venture projects. A French diplomat told us
that a French company inquiring about its overdue accounts
receivable from a Cuban bank was told that the bank had to
wait until funds arrived from Venezuela. Cuba is not yet as
dependent on Venezuela as it was on the Soviet Union.
However, a potential loss of even partial support for the
many activities Venezuelan enterprises are now involved in
would severely impact several facets of the Cuban economy. A
reduction of oil shipments in 2010 (Ref C) could bring the
economy to a halt.
¶10. (SBU) Hurricanes: The 2008 hurricane season devastated
many parts of the island (Ref D), but it mostly missed the
foreign income generating regions of Havana (tourism and most
industry), Matanzas (tourism), and Moa (nickel). It also had
only a modest effect on the sugar and tobacco industries.
The 2009 hurricane season, which began on June 1, is expected
to be less severe than 2008. However, one or two hurricanes
that target these regions would cut Cuba's foreign earnings
even further and raise serious questions around Cuba's
solvency.
¶11. (C) Insolvency: Cuba effectively ran out of reserves in
1992 at the height of the Special Period. At that time,
Cubans experienced extensive cuts in their rations (food,
clothing, electricity, and fuel), a near end to public
transportation, and strict black market crackdowns. Since
the end of the Special Period, Cuba has built up some foreign
reserves, but, as one European diplomat with good ties in the
Cuban banking sector told us, the exact number remains one of
two key national secrets (along with the details of Cuba's
financial arrangement with Venezuela). The Central Bank of
Cuba has implemented strict new measures limiting foreign
currency transactions by foreign companies and further
controlling transactions by state companies. The French
Commercial Counselor expects Cuba to reach bankruptcy or near
bankruptcy by the end of the year.
----------------------------------
Is Cuba Better Prepared This Time?
----------------------------------
¶12. (C) Cuba's over-reliance on credit to pay for critical
imports and dependence on Venezuela for more than just oil
remain Cuba's primary vulnerabilities. In contrast to 1989,
however, Cuba has diversified both its trading partners and
sources of foreign currency. Whereas the former Soviet Union
represented 80 percent of Cuba's total trade in 1989, Cuba's
top five trade partners in 2007 represented only 60 percent
of total trade (in goods) with Venezuela on top at 20 percent
(followed by China with 18 percent, Canada with 10 percent,
Spain with 8 percent, and the United States with 4 percent).
Detailed 2008 numbers have not been released yet. All of
these partners, with the exception of the United States,
HAVANA 00000322 004 OF 005
offer Cuba extensive credit. The Spanish Commercial
Counselor told us that Spain is close to concluding a
renegotiation of its short term debt with Cuba. Spain and
Cuba have already agreed on the new structure of the debt
(some cancelled, the rest longer term) and the applicable
interest rate. The only remaining obstacle is how much new
credit Spain will offer Cuba.
¶13. (C) Some of the reforms that helped bring Cuba out of
the Special Period will also provide a cushion for the Cuban
economy today. Even with an expected fall in tourism this
year, Cuba may receive close to 2 million more tourists than
the 340,000 that arrived in 1990. Earlier this year, Cuba
re-started licensing private taxi cabs. Local paladars
(small, private restaurants) frequented by USINT staff remain
profitable self-employment ventures. Although remittances
are reportedly down so far this year, presumably due to the
world economic crisis, money and visits from family members
living abroad remain an important source of income for many
Cuban families. In addition, foreign investors remain
interested in key sectors like hydrocarbons and tourism in
spite of Cuba's liquidity problems, possibly in order to keep
a foot in the door before a hypothetical opening to U.S.
business. Furthermore, the Cuban government is much better
at capturing foreign currency than before 1990 through
customs, fees, taxes, and hard currency stores.
¶14. (SBU) The Special Period is still fresh in the minds of
all Cubans. For most, the problem was not one of income but
rather of a lack of supply. There was simply nothing to buy
and very little provided by the state. As a result, Cubans
have spent the past twenty years learning how to "escapar"
(literally to escape but usually meant to survive) without
relying on GOC assistance. The 2008 hurricanes returned many
families in eastern Cuba, Pinar del Rio, and the Isle of
Youth to desperate conditions with insufficient government
assistance. According to the World Food Program, most
hurricane assistance has now been delivered, so victims will
have to rely on their own efforts for sustenance (see septel
for information on the pending European Community aid package
which includes some humanitarian assistance). The
destruction caused by last year's hurricanes means that some
Cubans don't have as far to fall to reach standards of living
similar to the Special Period.
¶15. (SBU) On May 24, state newspaper Juventude Rebelde
reported on interviews conducted to determine how Cubans see
the effects of the global economic crisis on the country.
Most of the interviewees urged readers to "work harder" and
"soldier on" to help the country through this difficult time.
One retiree said he didn't think this is going to get as bad
as in the worst of the days of the 1990s. Several
respondents said Cubans were better prepared since they have
been trained to live through similar crises. The article
sought to dampen rumors of "catastrophic overtones" including
"no oil, soap, and other staples, (and) that the blackouts
will come back and that they will be long." The GOC and
official press have yet to offer any solutions other than a
call on the patriotic duty of all Cubans to save more and
spend less. Several GOC officials have echoed a 2005 quote
by Central Bank President Francisco Soberon turning the
political motto "Fatherland or Death" into its economic
equivalent of "Savings or Death".
--------
COMMENTS
--------
¶16. (C) Daily life for most Cubans remains extremely
difficult primarily due to a backward and mismanaged economy
and the lingering effects of last year's hurricanes. The
summer months promise even more hardship as the world
economic crisis finally makes its way to Cuban households.
Nevertheless, today's Cuban economy is less vulnerable to a
return to the lows of the Special Period thanks to more
diversified sources of income and credits, a more resourceful
Cuban population, and an actual (remittances and travel) and
theoretical (end of the embargo) opening of U.S.-Cuban
relations. By even mentioning the possibility of blackouts,
the GOC is trying to set the expectations of Cubans as low as
they can possibly go without triggering public unrest. If
HAVANA 00000322 005 OF 005
the GOC can show that Cubans working together can
successfully prevent massive blackouts, then it can at least
show level of competence and socialist pride. Further risks
remain, however, as hurricane season approaches and both
Venezuela and Cuba face their own financial crises.
FARRAR
Juan Cuellar
VZCZCXRO0670
RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG
RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHUB #0322/01 1551354
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 041354Z JUN 09
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4442
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCOGCA/COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO BAY CU
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DCC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 HAVANA 000322
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR WHA/CCA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2019
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL EFIN CU
SUBJECT: HOW MIGHT CUBA ENTER ANOTHER SPECIAL PERIOD?
REF: A. HAVANA 308
¶B. 06 HAVANA 8017
¶C. CARACAS 564
¶D. 07 HAVANA 761
Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) The combination of new warnings of potential
blackouts, serious liquidity issues, and potential (if not
already) reduced financial support from Venezuela has sparked
rumors on the street and in the international media that Cuba
may be headed toward another "Special Period". The reality
is that Cuba and Cubans are not as vulnerable as they were in
1989 before the end of Soviet subsidies. However, the Cuban
economy remains remarkably dependent on external markets and
access to credit. While the level of foreign reserves is a
well guarded secret, some analysts and USINT contacts believe
the GOC could run out of cash later this year without a
significant change of course. Energy austerity measures
officially began on June 1, starting with state companies and
then potentially moving to households. We expect a reduction
in non-fuel imports as a next step. End Summary
-----------------------------
Are We There Yet? No, But...
-----------------------------
¶2. (C) The standard of living for Cubans, while still not as
high as twenty years ago before the end of Soviet subsidies,
remains much better than the darkest days of the 1990 to 1993
period when GDP fell more than 35 percent. While we expect
zero to negative GDP growth in 2009 (Ref A), Cuba's latest
challenges have yet to seriously affect the average Cuban.
The GOC blames its current macroeconomic woes on the world
economic slowdown, the U.S. embargo, a particularly
destructive 2008 hurricane season, and general inefficiency
and waste. The GOC is quick to point out that no Cuban will
be evicted for failure to pay a mortgage and Cuban jobs
remain secure while rich countries are experiencing massive
layoffs. Nevertheless, the GOC has previewed other
difficulties that could soon reach Cuban households.
Liquidity Crunch
----------------
¶3. (C) Cuba has been in a perennial state of late-payment
for decades; sometimes due to legitimate cash shortages and
at other times simply as a negotiation tactic. Cuba has long
pointed to the crisis of the day to renegotiate short term
official debt, and we can not rule out that the GOC is simply
using the current world economic crisis to improve its cash
position. However, diplomatic contacts agree that Cuba's
current liquidity crunch is much deeper than in recent years.
Foreign companies are waiting three to six months to receive
payment, and some have already agreed to sell their assets
back to the GOC (Pebercan) or restructure their accounts
receivables (Sherritt) into medium to long term government
debt.
¶4. (C) The latest holdup appears to be at the banking level,
as Cuban state companies are reportedly making payments on
time but the payment transfers are delayed by the bank for
months before being released to the foreign enterprise.
Alternatively, the funds are deposited in the foreign
company's account for use within Cuba but they are not
permitted to transfer the funds abroad or into a foreign
currency. Initially, Cuban officials blamed the need to
divert resources to assist in the recovery from last year's
hurricanes, but now the main culprit appears to be the world
economic crisis. A reported collapse in all of Cuba's main
sources of foreign currency (nickel exports, tourism,
remittances) and an increase in the quantity and price of
Cuban imports have magnified an already increasing debt
burden. It is clear that the GOC is hemorrhaging cash.
Whether it has reached the crisis point or not is less clear.
Either way, the Cuban banking sector has lost much of the
credibility it had built in recent years, which has led some
HAVANA 00000322 002 OF 005
to speculate that long time Central Bank President Francisco
Soberon may finally be on his way out.
¶5. (C) CIMEX, Cuba's largest and most diversified holding
company, reported on May 20 that payments for some imports
have suffered delays, but the "will of the country" was to
meet its financial obligations. CIMEX also reported that
remittances were down so far in 2009. CIMEX controls Banco
Financiero International, the most important Cuban bank for
foreign trade related transactions, and the relationship with
remittance providers including Western Union and Canada's
Transcard through Financiera CIMEX. According to Reuters,
the GOC has called government ministries to cut spending by 6
percent and limit imports. European and Canadian diplomats
report reduced exports to Cuba so far this year, especially
for machinery and other non-food items. Ironically, and to
the visible dismay of our diplomatic colleagues, U.S. exports
to Cuba through the first quarter of 2009 were higher than
even last year's historic level. This dismay is heightened
by the fact that U.S. companies are paid on time while others
must wait as reported above. U.S. exports make up much of
the food consumed by Cubans and sold in the income generating
tourist industry, and U.S. law requires payment in cash in
advance. However, there are recent reports that Cuban
purchases of U.S. meat products have been cut through the
rest of 2009.
Threatened Blackouts
--------------------
¶6. (SBU) In 2005, Fidel Castro announced that his new Energy
Revolution would put a stop to blackouts in Cuba by the end
of 2006. The GOC took several measures over the next few
years to limit future blackouts (Ref B), including increasing
household electricity bills, swapping out refrigerators and
light bulbs, and importing hundreds of small generators.
Despite these steps, the official press announced on May 22
that "exceptional measures to save electricity shall be
applied throughout the country starting 1 June in an effort
to curb overconsumption, bring every center, municipality,
and province in line with their plan, and prevent power
cuts." The GOC identified 1,700 state enterprises as high
electricity users, 3,000 examples of waste in the public
sector, and four provinces with increasing home consumption.
The GOC is taking extreme measures to prevent countrywide
blackouts. A new austerity plan is being implemented by each
municipality and state enterprise to conserve energy. Local
energy councils are monitoring the daily use of electricity
and local authorities are conducting surprise inspections.
In the first few days of the new plan, provinces have been
strict in their stated intention to shut off a company's
electricity if it exceeds its budgeted allowance. There are
reports that the Holguin province shut off the electricity
for the offices and warehouses of the three nickel plants due
to overconsumption, although the plants themselves continue
to operate.
¶7. (SBU) Although households are not included in the formal
austerity program, the official press has highlighted fines
levied on residents caught rigging electricity meters, urged
personal energy savings, and threatened countrywide blackouts
if the situation doesn't improve. The summer 2005 blackouts
were a serious strain on Cuban households and the possibility
of a return to those days despite years of supposed reform in
the sector has clearly disappointed our Cuban contacts.
Frequent but short-lived power outages already take place on
a daily basis, but many Cubans refuse even to speculate on a
return to scheduled blackouts. Blackouts mean spoiled food,
no air conditioning during the brutal summer months, and no
cooking since the GOC recently swapped most gas stoves with
an electric version from China. According to GOC officials,
the root of this summer's energy crisis is not a lack of
generation capacity (as in 2005) but a shortage of fuel.
Cuba uses much of its own heavy crude oil for domestic
electricity production, but also relies on imports, in
particular Venezuelan deliveries of refined products to power
the (diesel) gas guzzling generators.
--------------------------------------------- ------------
Potential Triggers: Venezuela, Hurricanes, or Insolvency
--------------------------------------------- ------------
HAVANA 00000322 003 OF 005
¶8. (SBU) Venezuela: In addition to oil deliveries, Cuba and
Venezuelan oil conglomerate PDVSA have significant joint
ventures in Cuba, Venezuela, and other Petrocaribe countries.
Within Cuba, these ventures are focused on building and
expanding oil refining capacity, oil prospecting, gas
production, maritime transportation (crude oil and
byproducts), housing construction, agricultural production,
access to potable water, fishing, and transportation
services. Potential future operations include increasing
storage capabilities, enlarging cargo docks and navigation
channels, and constructing a network of pipelines, roads, and
services infrastructure. Venezuela has taken over from China
a joint venture to build a new nickel plant within three
years. In addition, Cuba and Venezuela are working on a
fiber optic cable with an ever changing completion date,
currently some time in 2010.
¶9. (C) The GOC started hinting that all was not rosy with
its economic relationship with Venezuela when, in an
unusually public display, the front page of the Communist
Party newspaper Granma reported on May 21 that Venezuela
would experience a 50 percent drop in petroleum revenue in
¶2009. The GOC reference to a lack of fuel rather than
generation capacity to explain energy shortages could
indicate either a reduction (or delay) in fuel supplies from
Venezuela or disappointing refining results through the
Cuba/PDVSA joint venture projects. A French diplomat told us
that a French company inquiring about its overdue accounts
receivable from a Cuban bank was told that the bank had to
wait until funds arrived from Venezuela. Cuba is not yet as
dependent on Venezuela as it was on the Soviet Union.
However, a potential loss of even partial support for the
many activities Venezuelan enterprises are now involved in
would severely impact several facets of the Cuban economy. A
reduction of oil shipments in 2010 (Ref C) could bring the
economy to a halt.
¶10. (SBU) Hurricanes: The 2008 hurricane season devastated
many parts of the island (Ref D), but it mostly missed the
foreign income generating regions of Havana (tourism and most
industry), Matanzas (tourism), and Moa (nickel). It also had
only a modest effect on the sugar and tobacco industries.
The 2009 hurricane season, which began on June 1, is expected
to be less severe than 2008. However, one or two hurricanes
that target these regions would cut Cuba's foreign earnings
even further and raise serious questions around Cuba's
solvency.
¶11. (C) Insolvency: Cuba effectively ran out of reserves in
1992 at the height of the Special Period. At that time,
Cubans experienced extensive cuts in their rations (food,
clothing, electricity, and fuel), a near end to public
transportation, and strict black market crackdowns. Since
the end of the Special Period, Cuba has built up some foreign
reserves, but, as one European diplomat with good ties in the
Cuban banking sector told us, the exact number remains one of
two key national secrets (along with the details of Cuba's
financial arrangement with Venezuela). The Central Bank of
Cuba has implemented strict new measures limiting foreign
currency transactions by foreign companies and further
controlling transactions by state companies. The French
Commercial Counselor expects Cuba to reach bankruptcy or near
bankruptcy by the end of the year.
----------------------------------
Is Cuba Better Prepared This Time?
----------------------------------
¶12. (C) Cuba's over-reliance on credit to pay for critical
imports and dependence on Venezuela for more than just oil
remain Cuba's primary vulnerabilities. In contrast to 1989,
however, Cuba has diversified both its trading partners and
sources of foreign currency. Whereas the former Soviet Union
represented 80 percent of Cuba's total trade in 1989, Cuba's
top five trade partners in 2007 represented only 60 percent
of total trade (in goods) with Venezuela on top at 20 percent
(followed by China with 18 percent, Canada with 10 percent,
Spain with 8 percent, and the United States with 4 percent).
Detailed 2008 numbers have not been released yet. All of
these partners, with the exception of the United States,
HAVANA 00000322 004 OF 005
offer Cuba extensive credit. The Spanish Commercial
Counselor told us that Spain is close to concluding a
renegotiation of its short term debt with Cuba. Spain and
Cuba have already agreed on the new structure of the debt
(some cancelled, the rest longer term) and the applicable
interest rate. The only remaining obstacle is how much new
credit Spain will offer Cuba.
¶13. (C) Some of the reforms that helped bring Cuba out of
the Special Period will also provide a cushion for the Cuban
economy today. Even with an expected fall in tourism this
year, Cuba may receive close to 2 million more tourists than
the 340,000 that arrived in 1990. Earlier this year, Cuba
re-started licensing private taxi cabs. Local paladars
(small, private restaurants) frequented by USINT staff remain
profitable self-employment ventures. Although remittances
are reportedly down so far this year, presumably due to the
world economic crisis, money and visits from family members
living abroad remain an important source of income for many
Cuban families. In addition, foreign investors remain
interested in key sectors like hydrocarbons and tourism in
spite of Cuba's liquidity problems, possibly in order to keep
a foot in the door before a hypothetical opening to U.S.
business. Furthermore, the Cuban government is much better
at capturing foreign currency than before 1990 through
customs, fees, taxes, and hard currency stores.
¶14. (SBU) The Special Period is still fresh in the minds of
all Cubans. For most, the problem was not one of income but
rather of a lack of supply. There was simply nothing to buy
and very little provided by the state. As a result, Cubans
have spent the past twenty years learning how to "escapar"
(literally to escape but usually meant to survive) without
relying on GOC assistance. The 2008 hurricanes returned many
families in eastern Cuba, Pinar del Rio, and the Isle of
Youth to desperate conditions with insufficient government
assistance. According to the World Food Program, most
hurricane assistance has now been delivered, so victims will
have to rely on their own efforts for sustenance (see septel
for information on the pending European Community aid package
which includes some humanitarian assistance). The
destruction caused by last year's hurricanes means that some
Cubans don't have as far to fall to reach standards of living
similar to the Special Period.
¶15. (SBU) On May 24, state newspaper Juventude Rebelde
reported on interviews conducted to determine how Cubans see
the effects of the global economic crisis on the country.
Most of the interviewees urged readers to "work harder" and
"soldier on" to help the country through this difficult time.
One retiree said he didn't think this is going to get as bad
as in the worst of the days of the 1990s. Several
respondents said Cubans were better prepared since they have
been trained to live through similar crises. The article
sought to dampen rumors of "catastrophic overtones" including
"no oil, soap, and other staples, (and) that the blackouts
will come back and that they will be long." The GOC and
official press have yet to offer any solutions other than a
call on the patriotic duty of all Cubans to save more and
spend less. Several GOC officials have echoed a 2005 quote
by Central Bank President Francisco Soberon turning the
political motto "Fatherland or Death" into its economic
equivalent of "Savings or Death".
--------
COMMENTS
--------
¶16. (C) Daily life for most Cubans remains extremely
difficult primarily due to a backward and mismanaged economy
and the lingering effects of last year's hurricanes. The
summer months promise even more hardship as the world
economic crisis finally makes its way to Cuban households.
Nevertheless, today's Cuban economy is less vulnerable to a
return to the lows of the Special Period thanks to more
diversified sources of income and credits, a more resourceful
Cuban population, and an actual (remittances and travel) and
theoretical (end of the embargo) opening of U.S.-Cuban
relations. By even mentioning the possibility of blackouts,
the GOC is trying to set the expectations of Cubans as low as
they can possibly go without triggering public unrest. If
HAVANA 00000322 005 OF 005
the GOC can show that Cubans working together can
successfully prevent massive blackouts, then it can at least
show level of competence and socialist pride. Further risks
remain, however, as hurricane season approaches and both
Venezuela and Cuba face their own financial crises.
FARRAR
Thursday, December 23, 2010
WikiCuba. La complicidad del mundo con la dictadura
Varios informes en WikiLeak acerca de Cuba contienen informaciones y aspectos importantes para analizarse en su contexto. Es como si de repente se abre una ventanita de la Realpolitik que nos muestra una realidad irrefutable. Este informe, firmado por el Jefe de la Mission de la Seccion de Intereses de Estados Unidos en Cuba, Jonathan Farrar quien asumio el cargo en Julio del 2008, asignado por Obama, quien ha ejercido la mayor parte de su carrera bajo la administracion de Bush en el Departamento de Estado, especialmente los relacionados a los derechos humanos y los de labor. (apriete aqui para ver resume) es un ejemplo. En pocas palabras, un oficial de carrera relata hechos y actitudes que deben dejar boquiabiertos a unos cuantos en el exilio.
Con un lenguaje claro y hasta severo, el diplomatico norteamericano critica la politica de "ser amigo del gobierno de Cuba a cualquier costo", "no hablar de derechos humanos "y "buenos amigos siempre" asumida por la mayoria de los 100 paises que tienen "misiones" en Cuba y como la minoria restante que incluye Europa, Canada, Australia, Japon, ni siquiera tocan el tema de los derechos humanos, ascediendo ante las guaperias, buconadas y presiones del Gobierno de Cuba" para obtener recompensas risibles: Comidas y reuniones pomposas y algunas fotos con los hermanos Castro como el premio mayor."
Una fotocopia del sentimiento enarbolado por el exilio al respecto. Hermosa sensacion se siente cuando uno comprueba que no se ha equivocado a la hora de decir y actuar con la verdad, cuando supo que el silencio complice son cosas del cobarde y que el grito justo -a lo Juan El Bautista- en contra del mal y la vileza nunca calla ante ningun Rey, Gobernante, Cardenal, Obispo o Papa de lo que sea. Cuando sabe que ha navegado la historia con acierto.
Juan Cuellar
EL DOCUMENTO
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HAVANA 000706
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/CCA
STATE FOR DRL CNEWLING
EO 12958 DECL: 10/23/2019
TAGS PREL, PHUM, PGOV, CU
SUBJECT: FEISTY LITTLE MISSIONS DENT CUBA’S RECORD OF
BULLYING OTHERS TO SILENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS
REF: A. HAVANA 619 (RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR) B. HAVAN
592 (GOC SIGNALS “READINESS TO MOVE FORWARDâ€) C. VATICAN 117 (“VATICAN TWO-STEP WITH CUBAâ€)
HAVANA 00000706 001.3 OF 003
Classified By: Poloff Joaquin F. Monserrate for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C)
Summary. The Cuban Government has been able to stonewall its independent civil society from foreign visitors who have, for the large part, been all too ready to give in to Cuban bullying and give up on these encounters. A series of recent visits has shown the different approaches that foreign governments have taken to highlight, or not, Cuba’s sorry human rights record. The Asutralian Foreign Minister, Switzerland’s Human Rights Special Envoy and the Canadian Cabinet-level Minister of the Americas not only failed to meet with non-government Cubans, they didn’t even bother to publicly call for more freedoms after visiting Cuba in November. Though also shunning NGOs, recent emissaries from the Vatican and the EU, at least called out publicly for greater rights. Some holdouts remain, refusing to bring anyone of note if the Cubans insist on conditioning access. Regardless of the approach, the result tends to be the same. There is little of substance to be gained from a “friends-at-all-costs†approach to Cuba. End Summary.
THE “BEST-FRIENDS-FOREVER†APPROACH: DO, SAY NOTHING
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶2. (C) Practitioners of this approach to Cuba include most countries, including all Latin Americans and Africans, Russians and Chinese, and many Europeans. The Brazilian Polcouns in Havana best summed up this style: “We don’t raise (human rights) in public or private.†No wonder, the U.K. number-two in Havana grumbled, that “Cuba would love nothing more than to have the same relationship with us that they have with Brazil.†Most of these countries would not raise human rights even if the Government of Cuba (GOC) did not object to them doing so. This group apparently now includes the Swiss and Australians.
¶3. (C) The Swiss Human Rights Special Envoy Rudolf Knoblauch met with his Cuban counterparts on November 12, government-organized groups (GONGOs) and the Catholic Cardinal. He did not meet with civil society leaders nor make any public reference to Cuba’s human rights record (“not the Swiss way to do things,†they told us). More surprisingly, however, the Swiss admitted that Knoblauch did not raise Cuba’s human rights situation in private. As part of the “Periodic Review,†under their bilateral Dialogue, the Swiss and the Cubans discussed multilateral human rights issues, such as accession to international conventions and the UNCHR, but did not touch upon Cuba’s political prisoners, access to prisons or the still-unscheduled visit of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture (Ref A).
They invited Cuban officials to tour Swiss jails, something the Swiss said “had worked†in their relations with Vietnam.
¶4. (C) Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith met with Cuba’s Vice President Jose Ramon Machado and Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez on November 23. According to Australian press reports, Smith said how “pleased†he was with Australia-Cuba relations and praised bilateral “friendship and cooperation,†while Rodriguez thanked Australia for its support against the U.S. embargo at the United Nations, the Cuban press reported. Nothing was said in public about political or economic reforms, or human rights.
THE “KEEP-IT-PRIVATE†APPROACH: SAY NOTHING PUBLICLY
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶5. (C) It is hard to gauge how many countries really bring up
HAVANA 00000706 002.3 OF 003
the tough subjects when they meet in private with the Cubans, but many claim to do so. Although nothing of substance stops visitors from engaging with civil society quietly (the way, for instance, we managed to do with our U.S. visitors in September, Ref B), most countries opt to shun meetings altogether, bowing to Cuban pressure. Spain falls mostly in this group, although to their credit, Foreign Minister Moratinos spoke of the need for “gestures†after his meetings here in September. Canada laid a claim on this group after the November visit of Americas Minister Peter Kent.
¶6. (C) The Canadians also failed to meet with the independent civil society or make public pronouncements after the visit of Minister Kent. This was surprising, since Kent and Prime Minister Harper had been publicly critical of Cuba’s human rights record, something that led the GOC to cancel Kent’s visit last April. Canadian officials in Havana told us that Kent raised the issue of Cuba’s political prisoners but that the GOC had immediately turned the discussion into one of definitions. (Note: The GOC claims all of its prisoners of conscience are common criminals. Its stock answer to the topic is to deny it holds political prisoners.) It’s an interesting debate, our Canadian counterparts claimed, “If someone takes money from the U.S., does that make him a political prisoner?â€
¶7. (C) In his meetings with Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez, Kent reportedly asked also about the visit of the Special Rapporteur, but again the Cubans changed the subject. “How many Rapporteur visits has Canada had?,†Rodriguez was said to have shot back. Kent left town saying little, a style that “works better for the (GOC),†our northerly neighbors assured us.
THE “WE-RESPECTFULLY-DISAGREE†APPROACH: GOING PUBLIC
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶8. (C) The missions that air their concerns publicly are in the minority. Although the official press ignores it, the GOC frowns upon these utterances and often acts offended. Countries that go public usually also meet with civil society, but others don’t. Outspoken visitors sometimes step out of their missions’ carefully managed talking points, as was apparently the case, for instance, of the latest high-level visitors to Cuba from the European Union and the Holy See.
¶9. (C) The EU Commission in Havana sits snuggly in the “Best-Friends-Forever camp. Their functionaries share with us their reproach of the radical Swedes and Czechs, with their human rights priorities, and can’t wait for “moderate†Spain to take over the EU Presidency. The former Development Commissioner, Louis Michel, keenly followed that line during his visits to Cuba. Not so his successor.
¶10. (C) On an early November visit to Cuba, the Belgian Karel de Gucht put aside Cuban equivocations and declared that “there is a set of fundamental rights that are universal,†and called on Cuba to “create the right conditions†to enact these rights. In respectful tones and emphasizing that the EU was not after “regime change,†De Gucht put the GOC on notice that, if it did not begin to improve its human rights record, it could give up any hope of normalizing relations with the EU. Despite this, in a November 23 interview with CNN, de Gucht seemed to soften this line and called for normalization without demanding prior gestures from Cuba.
¶11. (C) The Vatican’s Social Communications Council President Archbishop Claudio Cello, a grizzled veteran of China-Vatican negotiations, also mixed praise with tough love. Originally calling on the GOC to allow further radio access to Cuban churches, Celli went off script, and called on greater information and internet access for all Cubans. He even
HAVANA 00000706 003.3 OF 003
singled out Cuba’s blogger community for praise, something the GOC “didn’t like at all,†according to Holy See diplomats in Havana (leading Celli to “clarify†his comments upon his return to Rome).
THE “TAKE-YOUR-VISIT-AND-SHOVE-IT†APPROACH: LITTLE LOST
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶12. (C) Some countries refuse to let the GOC dictate to them when it comes to visitors. Although they will accommodate GOC petulancy by hosting dual national day ceremonies (and spare Cuban officials the “affront†of sharing space with Cubans it deems unworthy) and cordon off their ambassadors from civil society engagement, the holdout countries resist pressure to disengage from civil society altogether. In many cases they have chosen to keep their principals at home if the price is kowtowing to the GOC. Germany, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom may pay a price in terms of lost business and access from their principled stance. Others who stand in this camp have less to lose from sticking it to the Cubans, and include Poland and Sweden.
¶13. (C) In November, the Ambassador for the Order of Malta (a Catholic church NGO given diplomatic status by the GOC) took the “take-it-and-shove†it approach to new heights. After the GOC told him that he could only bring in the Belgian Ambassador (firmly in the “BFF†camp) but not the USINT Chief of Mission to a humanitarian event he was organizing at a leper hospital, he cancelled the event and left town.
¶14. (C) COMMENT. The Cuba overwhelming majority of the 100 foreign missions in Havana do not face a human rights dilemma in their dealings with the Cubans. These countries wouldn’t raise the issue anyway. The rest, a group that includes most of Europe, Canada, Australia, Japan and the United States, claim to employ different approaches to address their human rights concerns in Cuba -- but the truth is that most of these countries do not press the issue at all in Cuba. The GOC does not like to talk about its human rights situation, and even less to be lectured publicly. It deploys considerable resources to bluff and bully many missions and their visitors into silence. For the most part the rewards for acquiescing to GOC demands are risible: pomp-full dinners and meetings and, for the most pliant, a photo-op with one of the Castro brothers. In terms of substance or economic benefits, they fare little better than those who stand up to the GOC. FARRAR
Con un lenguaje claro y hasta severo, el diplomatico norteamericano critica la politica de "ser amigo del gobierno de Cuba a cualquier costo", "no hablar de derechos humanos "y "buenos amigos siempre" asumida por la mayoria de los 100 paises que tienen "misiones" en Cuba y como la minoria restante que incluye Europa, Canada, Australia, Japon, ni siquiera tocan el tema de los derechos humanos, ascediendo ante las guaperias, buconadas y presiones del Gobierno de Cuba" para obtener recompensas risibles: Comidas y reuniones pomposas y algunas fotos con los hermanos Castro como el premio mayor."
Una fotocopia del sentimiento enarbolado por el exilio al respecto. Hermosa sensacion se siente cuando uno comprueba que no se ha equivocado a la hora de decir y actuar con la verdad, cuando supo que el silencio complice son cosas del cobarde y que el grito justo -a lo Juan El Bautista- en contra del mal y la vileza nunca calla ante ningun Rey, Gobernante, Cardenal, Obispo o Papa de lo que sea. Cuando sabe que ha navegado la historia con acierto.
Juan Cuellar
EL DOCUMENTO
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HAVANA 000706
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/CCA
STATE FOR DRL CNEWLING
EO 12958 DECL: 10/23/2019
TAGS PREL, PHUM, PGOV, CU
SUBJECT: FEISTY LITTLE MISSIONS DENT CUBA’S RECORD OF
BULLYING OTHERS TO SILENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS
REF: A. HAVANA 619 (RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR) B. HAVAN
592 (GOC SIGNALS “READINESS TO MOVE FORWARDâ€) C. VATICAN 117 (“VATICAN TWO-STEP WITH CUBAâ€)
HAVANA 00000706 001.3 OF 003
Classified By: Poloff Joaquin F. Monserrate for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C)
Summary. The Cuban Government has been able to stonewall its independent civil society from foreign visitors who have, for the large part, been all too ready to give in to Cuban bullying and give up on these encounters. A series of recent visits has shown the different approaches that foreign governments have taken to highlight, or not, Cuba’s sorry human rights record. The Asutralian Foreign Minister, Switzerland’s Human Rights Special Envoy and the Canadian Cabinet-level Minister of the Americas not only failed to meet with non-government Cubans, they didn’t even bother to publicly call for more freedoms after visiting Cuba in November. Though also shunning NGOs, recent emissaries from the Vatican and the EU, at least called out publicly for greater rights. Some holdouts remain, refusing to bring anyone of note if the Cubans insist on conditioning access. Regardless of the approach, the result tends to be the same. There is little of substance to be gained from a “friends-at-all-costs†approach to Cuba. End Summary.
THE “BEST-FRIENDS-FOREVER†APPROACH: DO, SAY NOTHING
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶2. (C) Practitioners of this approach to Cuba include most countries, including all Latin Americans and Africans, Russians and Chinese, and many Europeans. The Brazilian Polcouns in Havana best summed up this style: “We don’t raise (human rights) in public or private.†No wonder, the U.K. number-two in Havana grumbled, that “Cuba would love nothing more than to have the same relationship with us that they have with Brazil.†Most of these countries would not raise human rights even if the Government of Cuba (GOC) did not object to them doing so. This group apparently now includes the Swiss and Australians.
¶3. (C) The Swiss Human Rights Special Envoy Rudolf Knoblauch met with his Cuban counterparts on November 12, government-organized groups (GONGOs) and the Catholic Cardinal. He did not meet with civil society leaders nor make any public reference to Cuba’s human rights record (“not the Swiss way to do things,†they told us). More surprisingly, however, the Swiss admitted that Knoblauch did not raise Cuba’s human rights situation in private. As part of the “Periodic Review,†under their bilateral Dialogue, the Swiss and the Cubans discussed multilateral human rights issues, such as accession to international conventions and the UNCHR, but did not touch upon Cuba’s political prisoners, access to prisons or the still-unscheduled visit of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture (Ref A).
They invited Cuban officials to tour Swiss jails, something the Swiss said “had worked†in their relations with Vietnam.
¶4. (C) Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith met with Cuba’s Vice President Jose Ramon Machado and Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez on November 23. According to Australian press reports, Smith said how “pleased†he was with Australia-Cuba relations and praised bilateral “friendship and cooperation,†while Rodriguez thanked Australia for its support against the U.S. embargo at the United Nations, the Cuban press reported. Nothing was said in public about political or economic reforms, or human rights.
THE “KEEP-IT-PRIVATE†APPROACH: SAY NOTHING PUBLICLY
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶5. (C) It is hard to gauge how many countries really bring up
HAVANA 00000706 002.3 OF 003
the tough subjects when they meet in private with the Cubans, but many claim to do so. Although nothing of substance stops visitors from engaging with civil society quietly (the way, for instance, we managed to do with our U.S. visitors in September, Ref B), most countries opt to shun meetings altogether, bowing to Cuban pressure. Spain falls mostly in this group, although to their credit, Foreign Minister Moratinos spoke of the need for “gestures†after his meetings here in September. Canada laid a claim on this group after the November visit of Americas Minister Peter Kent.
¶6. (C) The Canadians also failed to meet with the independent civil society or make public pronouncements after the visit of Minister Kent. This was surprising, since Kent and Prime Minister Harper had been publicly critical of Cuba’s human rights record, something that led the GOC to cancel Kent’s visit last April. Canadian officials in Havana told us that Kent raised the issue of Cuba’s political prisoners but that the GOC had immediately turned the discussion into one of definitions. (Note: The GOC claims all of its prisoners of conscience are common criminals. Its stock answer to the topic is to deny it holds political prisoners.) It’s an interesting debate, our Canadian counterparts claimed, “If someone takes money from the U.S., does that make him a political prisoner?â€
¶7. (C) In his meetings with Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez, Kent reportedly asked also about the visit of the Special Rapporteur, but again the Cubans changed the subject. “How many Rapporteur visits has Canada had?,†Rodriguez was said to have shot back. Kent left town saying little, a style that “works better for the (GOC),†our northerly neighbors assured us.
THE “WE-RESPECTFULLY-DISAGREE†APPROACH: GOING PUBLIC
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶8. (C) The missions that air their concerns publicly are in the minority. Although the official press ignores it, the GOC frowns upon these utterances and often acts offended. Countries that go public usually also meet with civil society, but others don’t. Outspoken visitors sometimes step out of their missions’ carefully managed talking points, as was apparently the case, for instance, of the latest high-level visitors to Cuba from the European Union and the Holy See.
¶9. (C) The EU Commission in Havana sits snuggly in the “Best-Friends-Forever camp. Their functionaries share with us their reproach of the radical Swedes and Czechs, with their human rights priorities, and can’t wait for “moderate†Spain to take over the EU Presidency. The former Development Commissioner, Louis Michel, keenly followed that line during his visits to Cuba. Not so his successor.
¶10. (C) On an early November visit to Cuba, the Belgian Karel de Gucht put aside Cuban equivocations and declared that “there is a set of fundamental rights that are universal,†and called on Cuba to “create the right conditions†to enact these rights. In respectful tones and emphasizing that the EU was not after “regime change,†De Gucht put the GOC on notice that, if it did not begin to improve its human rights record, it could give up any hope of normalizing relations with the EU. Despite this, in a November 23 interview with CNN, de Gucht seemed to soften this line and called for normalization without demanding prior gestures from Cuba.
¶11. (C) The Vatican’s Social Communications Council President Archbishop Claudio Cello, a grizzled veteran of China-Vatican negotiations, also mixed praise with tough love. Originally calling on the GOC to allow further radio access to Cuban churches, Celli went off script, and called on greater information and internet access for all Cubans. He even
HAVANA 00000706 003.3 OF 003
singled out Cuba’s blogger community for praise, something the GOC “didn’t like at all,†according to Holy See diplomats in Havana (leading Celli to “clarify†his comments upon his return to Rome).
THE “TAKE-YOUR-VISIT-AND-SHOVE-IT†APPROACH: LITTLE LOST
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶12. (C) Some countries refuse to let the GOC dictate to them when it comes to visitors. Although they will accommodate GOC petulancy by hosting dual national day ceremonies (and spare Cuban officials the “affront†of sharing space with Cubans it deems unworthy) and cordon off their ambassadors from civil society engagement, the holdout countries resist pressure to disengage from civil society altogether. In many cases they have chosen to keep their principals at home if the price is kowtowing to the GOC. Germany, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom may pay a price in terms of lost business and access from their principled stance. Others who stand in this camp have less to lose from sticking it to the Cubans, and include Poland and Sweden.
¶13. (C) In November, the Ambassador for the Order of Malta (a Catholic church NGO given diplomatic status by the GOC) took the “take-it-and-shove†it approach to new heights. After the GOC told him that he could only bring in the Belgian Ambassador (firmly in the “BFF†camp) but not the USINT Chief of Mission to a humanitarian event he was organizing at a leper hospital, he cancelled the event and left town.
¶14. (C) COMMENT. The Cuba overwhelming majority of the 100 foreign missions in Havana do not face a human rights dilemma in their dealings with the Cubans. These countries wouldn’t raise the issue anyway. The rest, a group that includes most of Europe, Canada, Australia, Japan and the United States, claim to employ different approaches to address their human rights concerns in Cuba -- but the truth is that most of these countries do not press the issue at all in Cuba. The GOC does not like to talk about its human rights situation, and even less to be lectured publicly. It deploys considerable resources to bluff and bully many missions and their visitors into silence. For the most part the rewards for acquiescing to GOC demands are risible: pomp-full dinners and meetings and, for the most pliant, a photo-op with one of the Castro brothers. In terms of substance or economic benefits, they fare little better than those who stand up to the GOC. FARRAR
Wednesday, December 22, 2010
"Todos seran liberados" Confirma el cardenal Alomio.
AFP)- El cardenal cubano Jaime Ortega expresó el lunes su certeza de que quedará en libertad hasta el último de los 52 presos políticos que el Gobierno de Cuba prometió excarcelar y reiteró que oficiará una misa el viernes en la prisión Combinado del Este, la mayor de la isla."Sobre los presos, he dicho muchas veces que hay una promesa formal (del Gobierno) de que todos serán liberados", dijo Ortega a la prensa al término de un concierto en la Catedral de La Habana, durante el cual dio a conocer su mensaje de Navidad.
En el mensaje, "he dicho todo lo que tenía en mi corazón para la Navidad, que este año debe llenarnos de esperanza" y "la esperanza lo incluye todo", añadió monseñor Ortega.
No obstante, declinó "hacer conjeturas" sobre cuándo serán liberados los 11 presos políticos que esperan ser excarcelados según la promesa que hizo el Gobierno a la Iglesia Católica, de liberar a 52 opositores que quedan en prisión de 75 condenados en 2003 a penas de entre seis y 28 años de cárcel.Tras un inédito diálogo instalado en mayo entre el presidente Raúl Castro y Ortega, 40 de los 52 fueron excarcelados después de aceptar salir a España y otro liberado optó por quedarse en Cuba. Pero 11 que rechazan el exilio permanecen en la cárcel, pese a que el plazo que dio el Gobierno a la Iglesia venció en noviembre.
"Repito lo mismo que he dicho desde hace meses, que hay una promesa formal de dejar a los presos todos en libertad hasta el (último) del grupo de los 52. Ya salió uno que se queda en Cuba y espero que salgan los demás", apuntó Ortega.
Reiteró que "todos los años" da "una misa en alguna cárcel" de la isla y que este año será el próximo viernes "en el Combinado del Este", la mayor prisión de Cuba, en las afueras de La Habana, donde cumplen sus condenas dos de los 11 opositores que rechazan abandonar la isla.En 2009, el Gobierno autorizó a las iglesias Católica y Evangélica a realizar celebraciones religiosas de manera permanente en las prisiones -hasta entonces ocasionalmente y de forma individual- y en la pasada Navidad, varios obispos acudieron a centros penitenciarios de la isla.
Tuesday, December 21, 2010
Wikileaks: Seccion de Intereses en Cuba
Reference ID
Subject
Created
Released
Classification
Origin
06HAVANA11650
CARTAS DE CUBA: EARLY SUMMER EDITION
2006-06-05
2010-12-18
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
07HAVANA258
CUBA: HOW BELIEVABLE IS A FIDEL CASTRO COMEBACK?
2007-03-16
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA35
THE SPECULATION ON FIDEL'S HEALTH
2009-01-15
2010-12-17
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA221
THE U.S. AND THE ROLE OF THE OPPOSITION IN CUBA
2009-04-15
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA706
FEISTY LITTLE MISSIONS DENT CUBA’S RECORD OF
2009-11-24
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA726
SPAIN ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIALOGUE WITH CUBA
2009-12-05
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
08HAVANA103
CUBAN HEALTHCARE: “AQUI NADA ES FACILâ€
2008-01-31
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA344
FIDEL CASTRO IMPRESSED BY POTUS AFTER CAIRO SPEECH
2009-06-10
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
10HAVANA11
CLIMATE CHANGE PROVIDES GOC WITH MUCH NEEDED
2010-01-07
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
06HAVANA8633
IF YOU DON'T HAVE YOUR HEALTH..." (AILMENTS AMONG
2006-04-20
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
06HAVANA9102
ROCA, SANCHEZ RAP USINT'S INTERNET-ACCESS POLICY
2006-04-27
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
06HAVANA23546
LANDMARK FORUM BRINGS TOGETHER YOUNG CUBAN
2006-11-27
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
07HAVANA210
CUBAN OPPOSITION TO REGIME: THE (ART) SHOW MUST GO
2007-03-05
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
07HAVANA252
XXXXXXXXXXXXNEED A MILLION CUBANS IN THE STREETS
2007-03-15
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
08HAVANA66
COMSEC DISCUSSES FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY WITH CUBAN
2008-01-18
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
08HAVANA168
CUBAN YOUTH CAUGHT BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR
2008-02-20
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA172
CUBAN MININT'S THOUGHTS ON TRAVEL, LAW
2009-03-17
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA278
U.S. LEGAL TEAM SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCTS WITNESS
2009-05-14
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA322
HOW MIGHT CUBA ENTER ANOTHER SPECIAL PERIOD?
2009-06-04
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA341
FROM THE MOUTH OF MINREX: POSSIBLE INSIGHT INTO
2009-06-09
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA462
OBSERVATIONS OF THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
2009-07-28
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA491
GOVERNMENT OF CUBA FRUSTRATION INCREASES OVER LACK
2009-08-11
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA559
CHECK PLEASE! GOVERNMENT OF CUBA MAY ACCEPT U.S.
2009-09-14
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA592
GOC SIGNALS "READINESS TO MOVE FORWARD"
2009-09-25
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
10HAVANA9
U.S.- CUBA CHILL EXAGGERATED, BUT OLD WAYS
2010-01-06
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
10HAVANA84
KEY TRADING PARTNERS SEE NO BIG ECONOMIC REFORMS
2010-02-09
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
07HAVANA5
CASTRO ALIVE FOR 48TH ANNIVERSARY OF REGIME
2007-01-03
2010-12-15
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
07HAVANA591
RAUL CASTRO'S WIFE VILMA ESPIN DIES
2007-06-19
2010-12-15
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA153
LAGE AND PEREZ ROQUE ADMIT "ERRORS" AND RESIGN ALL
2009-03-06
2010-12-15
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA132
ASSESSING THE RISK OF SOCIAL UNREST IN RUSSIA
Subject
Created
Released
Classification
Origin
06HAVANA11650
CARTAS DE CUBA: EARLY SUMMER EDITION
2006-06-05
2010-12-18
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
07HAVANA258
CUBA: HOW BELIEVABLE IS A FIDEL CASTRO COMEBACK?
2007-03-16
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA35
THE SPECULATION ON FIDEL'S HEALTH
2009-01-15
2010-12-17
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA221
THE U.S. AND THE ROLE OF THE OPPOSITION IN CUBA
2009-04-15
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA706
FEISTY LITTLE MISSIONS DENT CUBA’S RECORD OF
2009-11-24
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA726
SPAIN ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIALOGUE WITH CUBA
2009-12-05
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
08HAVANA103
CUBAN HEALTHCARE: “AQUI NADA ES FACILâ€
2008-01-31
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA344
FIDEL CASTRO IMPRESSED BY POTUS AFTER CAIRO SPEECH
2009-06-10
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
10HAVANA11
CLIMATE CHANGE PROVIDES GOC WITH MUCH NEEDED
2010-01-07
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
06HAVANA8633
IF YOU DON'T HAVE YOUR HEALTH..." (AILMENTS AMONG
2006-04-20
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
06HAVANA9102
ROCA, SANCHEZ RAP USINT'S INTERNET-ACCESS POLICY
2006-04-27
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
06HAVANA23546
LANDMARK FORUM BRINGS TOGETHER YOUNG CUBAN
2006-11-27
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
07HAVANA210
CUBAN OPPOSITION TO REGIME: THE (ART) SHOW MUST GO
2007-03-05
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
07HAVANA252
XXXXXXXXXXXXNEED A MILLION CUBANS IN THE STREETS
2007-03-15
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
08HAVANA66
COMSEC DISCUSSES FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY WITH CUBAN
2008-01-18
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
08HAVANA168
CUBAN YOUTH CAUGHT BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR
2008-02-20
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA172
CUBAN MININT'S THOUGHTS ON TRAVEL, LAW
2009-03-17
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA278
U.S. LEGAL TEAM SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCTS WITNESS
2009-05-14
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA322
HOW MIGHT CUBA ENTER ANOTHER SPECIAL PERIOD?
2009-06-04
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA341
FROM THE MOUTH OF MINREX: POSSIBLE INSIGHT INTO
2009-06-09
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA462
OBSERVATIONS OF THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
2009-07-28
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA491
GOVERNMENT OF CUBA FRUSTRATION INCREASES OVER LACK
2009-08-11
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA559
CHECK PLEASE! GOVERNMENT OF CUBA MAY ACCEPT U.S.
2009-09-14
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA592
GOC SIGNALS "READINESS TO MOVE FORWARD"
2009-09-25
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
10HAVANA9
U.S.- CUBA CHILL EXAGGERATED, BUT OLD WAYS
2010-01-06
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
10HAVANA84
KEY TRADING PARTNERS SEE NO BIG ECONOMIC REFORMS
2010-02-09
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
07HAVANA5
CASTRO ALIVE FOR 48TH ANNIVERSARY OF REGIME
2007-01-03
2010-12-15
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
07HAVANA591
RAUL CASTRO'S WIFE VILMA ESPIN DIES
2007-06-19
2010-12-15
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA153
LAGE AND PEREZ ROQUE ADMIT "ERRORS" AND RESIGN ALL
2009-03-06
2010-12-15
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA132
ASSESSING THE RISK OF SOCIAL UNREST IN RUSSIA
Wikileaks: SPECIAL ENVOY REICH'S MEETING WITH JOSE DIRCEU REF: BRASILIA 676
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SAO PAULO 000493
SIPDIS
NSC FOR MDEMPSEY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL CO BL CU VE BR UNHCR US
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY REICH'S MEETING WITH JOSE DIRCEU REF: BRASILIA 676
Classified By: CG PATRICK DUDDY for reasons 1.5(B) and (D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. White House Special Envoy for the Western Hemisphere Otto Reich met with President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva's Chief of Staff Jose Dirceu on Sunday, March 21 at a private residence in Sao Paulo. During the course of the relaxed and open 90-minute conversation, the two touched on current events in Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, Cuba, Haiti and Argentina, and expressed their intent to maintain an open channel of communication. Dirceu said that the Brazilian government is deeply concerned about the situation in Venezuela and in Cuba, and that the GOB would abstain (as it has in the past) on the UNHRC motion on Cuba. Dirceu indicated that he hoped to visit the United States in the near future, perhaps as soon as Easter week, or shortly thereafter. Reich was accompanied by Special Advisor to the Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs William Perry and Consul General Patrick Duddy. Dirceu was accompanied by Andre Araujo. End Summary.
¶2. (C) Following the exchange of opening pleasantries, Amb. Reich raised Venezuela, noting that the United States is deeply concerned with the deteriorating situation there. Dirceu stated that Brazil is also concerned with the situation in Venezuela. He noted that Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia was recently in Venezuela, and had prepared a report for President Lula on his visit. Dirceu said he had seen it, but had not yet had the opportunity to read the report in detail. He said he expected Lula and other senior advisors would discuss Venezuela early in the week of March 22. When asked what he thought the U.S. and Brazil could do together on Venezuela, Dirceu was non-comittal, reiterating that the GOB would discuss the Venezuelan situation in the coming week. However, Dirceu's comments about Chavez's behavior during the G-15 meeting in Caracas were quite critical, and he said Lula left the meeting early because he "was uncomfortable." He added that Lula had not returned any of Chavez's calls since then, but that he would probably do so soon in order to keep the communication open, as unpleasannt as it may be.
¶3. (C) On Bolivia, Reich stressed that the U.S. and Brazil have shared interests in that country, and a common interest in assisting Bolivia to maintain political stability. Reich noted his concern about the March 18 statement by a Foreign Ministry spokesman that Brazil had not attended the most recent meeting of the Bolivia Support Group in Washington because the GOB considered the meeting a "waste of time." Dirceu appeared to be surprised at hearing about the spokesman's statement, and took notes on Reich's points. He said he would talk to FM Amorim about it.
¶4. (SBU) Reich thanked the GOB for its willingness to help in Haiti, and to contribute peacekeeping forces. He asked Dirceu for clarification that the GOB would only participate in a UN Chapter 6 (peacekeeping), rather than a Chapter 7 (peace enforcement), mission in Haiti. Dirceu confirmed that that was correct. In response to Reich's question on whether the Brazilian deployment in Haiti could be moved forward, Dirceu was non-committal, noting only that the GOB had had financial concerns about the deployment which were being resolved. Dirceu noted that he also expected to speak to the President about Haiti during the coming week, and suggested that he might get back in touch on the issue.
¶5. (C) Reich raised the USG's continuing concern with the Cuban government's harsh repression of dissidents. Dirceu said that the GOB is also concerned about the situation in Cuba. He said, however, that the GOB would not "change its vote" on the Cuba motion in the upcoming UNHRC session; he said the GOB would abstain on the motion, as it has in past years. Dirceu noted that Cuba is a difficult issue for the Lula government, and a very difficult issue for him personally. (NOTE: Dirceu spent much of six years (1969-75) in exile in Cuba, after being expelled from Brazil by the military dictatorship. End Note.) Dirceu acknowledged that the Cuban government has not been receptive to private GOB overtures on treatment of detainees. He said the newly arrived Cuban Ambassador in Brasilia had refused to entertain any discussion of the issue, even in relation to a Brazilian citizen who had been arrested in Cuba for complicity in alien smuggling. Dirceu added that Lula had received the mother of the Brazilian detained in Cuba. Asked whether the Lula government would consider having Lula receive the mothers of detained Cuban dissidents as a gesture of concern, Dirceu said he would discuss the idea with others in the GOB, including the President. (COMMENT: No modalities were discussed. End Comment.)
¶6. (SBU) On Colombia, Dirceu noted that the GOB has a good relationship with Colombia. He said that Brazil was committed to stepped up military and police presence along Brazil's northern border, and mentioned the SIVAM Amazon surveillance system. Reich pointed out several indicators of progress in the GOC's efforts to ensure security in the country, including regaining control of all the towns previously controlled by rebel groups, significant numbers of surrenders by paramilitary members, and resumed economic growth of 4 percent in the last year. Dirceu indicated that he was aware of the improvements in the security situation in Colombia.
¶7. (C) Turning to Argentina, Dirceu commented that part of the problem is that it is not clear that the Kirchner government has a clear or comprehensive plan for extricating the country from its economic woes. Consequently, the government is in the position of having to "slay a lion" every week to stay out in front of impending crises. 8. (SBU) Dirceu said that he was planning to make a trip to the United States in the near future, possibly as soon as the week after Easter. He indicated interest in identifying an appropriate venue for making a speech or other public statement while there, as well as in meetings with USG officials. 9. (C) Comment. The cordial but frank exchange of views between Reich and Dirceu advanced the USG effort to maintain a robust and cooperative relationship with the GOB. While no immediate action items resulted from the meeting, Minister Dirceu said he would consult and get back in touch with Ambassador Reich on issues of mutual concern, including Venezuela, Cuba and possibly Haiti. Dirceu's comments on Haiti and Brazil's vote on the Cuba motion at the UNHRC track closely with Foreign Ministry UnderSecretary Vera Pedrosa's comments to Ambassador Hrinak on March 19, reported reftel. End Comment. 10.
(U) This message was coordinated with Embassy Brasilia and cleared by Ambassador Reich.
DUDDY
SIPDIS
NSC FOR MDEMPSEY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL CO BL CU VE BR UNHCR US
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY REICH'S MEETING WITH JOSE DIRCEU REF: BRASILIA 676
Classified By: CG PATRICK DUDDY for reasons 1.5(B) and (D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. White House Special Envoy for the Western Hemisphere Otto Reich met with President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva's Chief of Staff Jose Dirceu on Sunday, March 21 at a private residence in Sao Paulo. During the course of the relaxed and open 90-minute conversation, the two touched on current events in Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, Cuba, Haiti and Argentina, and expressed their intent to maintain an open channel of communication. Dirceu said that the Brazilian government is deeply concerned about the situation in Venezuela and in Cuba, and that the GOB would abstain (as it has in the past) on the UNHRC motion on Cuba. Dirceu indicated that he hoped to visit the United States in the near future, perhaps as soon as Easter week, or shortly thereafter. Reich was accompanied by Special Advisor to the Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs William Perry and Consul General Patrick Duddy. Dirceu was accompanied by Andre Araujo. End Summary.
¶2. (C) Following the exchange of opening pleasantries, Amb. Reich raised Venezuela, noting that the United States is deeply concerned with the deteriorating situation there. Dirceu stated that Brazil is also concerned with the situation in Venezuela. He noted that Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia was recently in Venezuela, and had prepared a report for President Lula on his visit. Dirceu said he had seen it, but had not yet had the opportunity to read the report in detail. He said he expected Lula and other senior advisors would discuss Venezuela early in the week of March 22. When asked what he thought the U.S. and Brazil could do together on Venezuela, Dirceu was non-comittal, reiterating that the GOB would discuss the Venezuelan situation in the coming week. However, Dirceu's comments about Chavez's behavior during the G-15 meeting in Caracas were quite critical, and he said Lula left the meeting early because he "was uncomfortable." He added that Lula had not returned any of Chavez's calls since then, but that he would probably do so soon in order to keep the communication open, as unpleasannt as it may be.
¶3. (C) On Bolivia, Reich stressed that the U.S. and Brazil have shared interests in that country, and a common interest in assisting Bolivia to maintain political stability. Reich noted his concern about the March 18 statement by a Foreign Ministry spokesman that Brazil had not attended the most recent meeting of the Bolivia Support Group in Washington because the GOB considered the meeting a "waste of time." Dirceu appeared to be surprised at hearing about the spokesman's statement, and took notes on Reich's points. He said he would talk to FM Amorim about it.
¶4. (SBU) Reich thanked the GOB for its willingness to help in Haiti, and to contribute peacekeeping forces. He asked Dirceu for clarification that the GOB would only participate in a UN Chapter 6 (peacekeeping), rather than a Chapter 7 (peace enforcement), mission in Haiti. Dirceu confirmed that that was correct. In response to Reich's question on whether the Brazilian deployment in Haiti could be moved forward, Dirceu was non-committal, noting only that the GOB had had financial concerns about the deployment which were being resolved. Dirceu noted that he also expected to speak to the President about Haiti during the coming week, and suggested that he might get back in touch on the issue.
¶5. (C) Reich raised the USG's continuing concern with the Cuban government's harsh repression of dissidents. Dirceu said that the GOB is also concerned about the situation in Cuba. He said, however, that the GOB would not "change its vote" on the Cuba motion in the upcoming UNHRC session; he said the GOB would abstain on the motion, as it has in past years. Dirceu noted that Cuba is a difficult issue for the Lula government, and a very difficult issue for him personally. (NOTE: Dirceu spent much of six years (1969-75) in exile in Cuba, after being expelled from Brazil by the military dictatorship. End Note.) Dirceu acknowledged that the Cuban government has not been receptive to private GOB overtures on treatment of detainees. He said the newly arrived Cuban Ambassador in Brasilia had refused to entertain any discussion of the issue, even in relation to a Brazilian citizen who had been arrested in Cuba for complicity in alien smuggling. Dirceu added that Lula had received the mother of the Brazilian detained in Cuba. Asked whether the Lula government would consider having Lula receive the mothers of detained Cuban dissidents as a gesture of concern, Dirceu said he would discuss the idea with others in the GOB, including the President. (COMMENT: No modalities were discussed. End Comment.)
¶6. (SBU) On Colombia, Dirceu noted that the GOB has a good relationship with Colombia. He said that Brazil was committed to stepped up military and police presence along Brazil's northern border, and mentioned the SIVAM Amazon surveillance system. Reich pointed out several indicators of progress in the GOC's efforts to ensure security in the country, including regaining control of all the towns previously controlled by rebel groups, significant numbers of surrenders by paramilitary members, and resumed economic growth of 4 percent in the last year. Dirceu indicated that he was aware of the improvements in the security situation in Colombia.
¶7. (C) Turning to Argentina, Dirceu commented that part of the problem is that it is not clear that the Kirchner government has a clear or comprehensive plan for extricating the country from its economic woes. Consequently, the government is in the position of having to "slay a lion" every week to stay out in front of impending crises. 8. (SBU) Dirceu said that he was planning to make a trip to the United States in the near future, possibly as soon as the week after Easter. He indicated interest in identifying an appropriate venue for making a speech or other public statement while there, as well as in meetings with USG officials. 9. (C) Comment. The cordial but frank exchange of views between Reich and Dirceu advanced the USG effort to maintain a robust and cooperative relationship with the GOB. While no immediate action items resulted from the meeting, Minister Dirceu said he would consult and get back in touch with Ambassador Reich on issues of mutual concern, including Venezuela, Cuba and possibly Haiti. Dirceu's comments on Haiti and Brazil's vote on the Cuba motion at the UNHRC track closely with Foreign Ministry UnderSecretary Vera Pedrosa's comments to Ambassador Hrinak on March 19, reported reftel. End Comment. 10.
(U) This message was coordinated with Embassy Brasilia and cleared by Ambassador Reich.
DUDDY
Documentos acerca de Cuba en Wikileaks
Reference ID
Subject
Created
Released
Classification
Origin
04SAOPAULO493
SPECIAL ENVOY REICH'S MEETING WITH JOSE DIRCEU REF: BRASILIA 676
2004-03-26
2010-12-20
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Sao Paulo
06HAVANA11650
CARTAS DE CUBA: EARLY SUMMER EDITION
2006-06-05
2010-12-18
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
07HAVANA258
CUBA: HOW BELIEVABLE IS A FIDEL CASTRO COMEBACK?
2007-03-16
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA35
THE SPECULATION ON FIDEL'S HEALTH
2009-01-15
2010-12-17
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA221
THE U.S. AND THE ROLE OF THE OPPOSITION IN CUBA
2009-04-15
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA706
FEISTY LITTLE MISSIONS DENT CUBA’S RECORD OF
2009-11-24
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA726
SPAIN ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIALOGUE WITH CUBA
2009-12-05
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
04MADRID2492
SPAIN: LIBERTAD ACT TITLE III WAIVER REVIEW
2004-07-01
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
04MADRID4554
SPAIN/CUBA: REVIEW REGARDING SUSPENSION OF TITLE
2004-12-01
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
04MADRID4827
LOCAL NGO PRESSURES SPAIN ON CUBA HUMAN RIGHTS
2004-12-22
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
05MADRID2131
SPAIN/CUBA: TITLE III OF THE LIBERTAD ACT
2005-06-06
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
05MADRID4054
SPAIN/CUBA: TITLE III OF LIBERTAD ACT
2005-11-22
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
06MADRID1035
SPAIN/CUBA: TITLE III OF LIBERTAD ACT
2006-04-25
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
07MADRID1179
SPAIN/CUBA: LIBERTAD ACT, TITLE III
2007-06-15
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
07MADRID1420
C) SPAIN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CUBA (C-RE7-00940)
2007-07-18
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Madrid
08HAVANA103
CUBAN HEALTHCARE: “AQUI NADA ES FACILâ€
2008-01-31
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
08MADRID580
SPAIN/CUBA: TITLE III OF LIBERTAD ACT
2008-05-23
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
08MADRID1299
SPAIN/CUBA: TITLE III OF LIBERTAD ACT
2008-12-11
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
09MADRID483
SPAIN/CUBA: TITLE III OF LIBERTAD ACT
2009-05-19
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
09HAVANA344
FIDEL CASTRO IMPRESSED BY POTUS AFTER CAIRO SPEECH
2009-06-10
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09MADRID1121
SPAIN/CUBA: TITLE III OF THE LIBERTAD ACT
2009-11-23
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
10HAVANA11
CLIMATE CHANGE PROVIDES GOC WITH MUCH NEEDED
2010-01-07
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
08STATE100219
Secretary Rice's 09/16/2008 Meeting with
2008-09-19
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
06HAVANA8633
IF YOU DON'T HAVE YOUR HEALTH..." (AILMENTS AMONG
2006-04-20
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
06HAVANA9102
ROCA, SANCHEZ RAP USINT'S INTERNET-ACCESS POLICY
2006-04-27
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
06HAVANA23546
LANDMARK FORUM BRINGS TOGETHER YOUNG CUBAN
2006-11-27
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
07HAVANA210
CUBAN OPPOSITION TO REGIME: THE (ART) SHOW MUST GO
2007-03-05
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
07HAVANA252
XXXXXXXXXXXXNEED A MILLION CUBANS IN THE STREETS
2007-03-15
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
08HAVANA66
COMSEC DISCUSSES FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY WITH CUBAN
2008-01-18
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
08HAVANA168
CUBAN YOUTH CAUGHT BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR
2008-02-20
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA172
CUBAN MININT'S THOUGHTS ON TRAVEL, LAW
2009-03-17
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA278
U.S. LEGAL TEAM SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCTS WITNESS
2009-05-14
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA322
HOW MIGHT CUBA ENTER ANOTHER SPECIAL PERIOD?
2009-06-04
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA341
FROM THE MOUTH OF MINREX: POSSIBLE INSIGHT INTO
2009-06-09
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA462
OBSERVATIONS OF THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
2009-07-28
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA491
GOVERNMENT OF CUBA FRUSTRATION INCREASES OVER LACK
2009-08-11
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA559
CHECK PLEASE! GOVERNMENT OF CUBA MAY ACCEPT U.S.
2009-09-14
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
10HAVANA9
U.S.- CUBA CHILL EXAGGERATED, BUT OLD WAYS
2010-01-06
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
10HAVANA84
KEY TRADING PARTNERS SEE NO BIG ECONOMIC REFORMS
2010-02-09
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
05BRUSSELS1530
CUBA: EU COMMISSIONER MICHEL BOLSTERS CUBAN FONMIN
2005-04-18
2010-12-15
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Embassy Brussels
06CARACAS2367
CASTRO'S ILLNESS; IMPACT ON THE BRV, ON BRV-GOC
2006-08-10
2010-12-15
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Caracas
06MADRID3095
SPAIN/CUBA: SPANISH DOCTOR CONSULTS ON CASTRO
2006-12-27
2010-12-15
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
07HAVANA5
CASTRO ALIVE FOR 48TH ANNIVERSARY OF REGIME
2007-01-03
2010-12-15
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
07HAVANA591
RAUL CASTRO'S WIFE VILMA ESPIN DIES
2007-06-19
2010-12-15
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA153
LAGE AND PEREZ ROQUE ADMIT "ERRORS" AND RESIGN ALL
2009-03-06
2010-12-15
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
10MADRID187
A/S VALENZUELA DISCUSSES LATIN AMERICA WITH
2010-02-18
2010-12-15
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
09VATICAN59
C) VATICAN HOPES FOR BETTER U.S.-CUBA TIES, IN PART TO REIN
2009-04-22
2010-12-10
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vatican
10VATICAN13
GREEN†POPE SUPPORTS US PATH FORWARD FROM COPENHAGEN
2010-01-21
2010-12-10
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vatican
10VATICAN14
VATICAN OFFICIAL ON CUBA RELATIONS WITH EU AND U.S.
2010-01-21
2010-12-10
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vatican
04MADRID3914
CUBA: MFA ON INVITING DISSIDENTS TO SPANISH
2004-10-07
2010-12-10
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
<< 1 .. 1 2 .. 2 >>
Subject
Created
Released
Classification
Origin
04SAOPAULO493
SPECIAL ENVOY REICH'S MEETING WITH JOSE DIRCEU REF: BRASILIA 676
2004-03-26
2010-12-20
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Sao Paulo
06HAVANA11650
CARTAS DE CUBA: EARLY SUMMER EDITION
2006-06-05
2010-12-18
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
07HAVANA258
CUBA: HOW BELIEVABLE IS A FIDEL CASTRO COMEBACK?
2007-03-16
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA35
THE SPECULATION ON FIDEL'S HEALTH
2009-01-15
2010-12-17
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA221
THE U.S. AND THE ROLE OF THE OPPOSITION IN CUBA
2009-04-15
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA706
FEISTY LITTLE MISSIONS DENT CUBA’S RECORD OF
2009-11-24
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA726
SPAIN ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIALOGUE WITH CUBA
2009-12-05
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
04MADRID2492
SPAIN: LIBERTAD ACT TITLE III WAIVER REVIEW
2004-07-01
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
04MADRID4554
SPAIN/CUBA: REVIEW REGARDING SUSPENSION OF TITLE
2004-12-01
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
04MADRID4827
LOCAL NGO PRESSURES SPAIN ON CUBA HUMAN RIGHTS
2004-12-22
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
05MADRID2131
SPAIN/CUBA: TITLE III OF THE LIBERTAD ACT
2005-06-06
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
05MADRID4054
SPAIN/CUBA: TITLE III OF LIBERTAD ACT
2005-11-22
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
06MADRID1035
SPAIN/CUBA: TITLE III OF LIBERTAD ACT
2006-04-25
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
07MADRID1179
SPAIN/CUBA: LIBERTAD ACT, TITLE III
2007-06-15
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
07MADRID1420
C) SPAIN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CUBA (C-RE7-00940)
2007-07-18
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Madrid
08HAVANA103
CUBAN HEALTHCARE: “AQUI NADA ES FACILâ€
2008-01-31
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
08MADRID580
SPAIN/CUBA: TITLE III OF LIBERTAD ACT
2008-05-23
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
08MADRID1299
SPAIN/CUBA: TITLE III OF LIBERTAD ACT
2008-12-11
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
09MADRID483
SPAIN/CUBA: TITLE III OF LIBERTAD ACT
2009-05-19
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
09HAVANA344
FIDEL CASTRO IMPRESSED BY POTUS AFTER CAIRO SPEECH
2009-06-10
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09MADRID1121
SPAIN/CUBA: TITLE III OF THE LIBERTAD ACT
2009-11-23
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
10HAVANA11
CLIMATE CHANGE PROVIDES GOC WITH MUCH NEEDED
2010-01-07
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
08STATE100219
Secretary Rice's 09/16/2008 Meeting with
2008-09-19
2010-12-17
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
06HAVANA8633
IF YOU DON'T HAVE YOUR HEALTH..." (AILMENTS AMONG
2006-04-20
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
06HAVANA9102
ROCA, SANCHEZ RAP USINT'S INTERNET-ACCESS POLICY
2006-04-27
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
06HAVANA23546
LANDMARK FORUM BRINGS TOGETHER YOUNG CUBAN
2006-11-27
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
07HAVANA210
CUBAN OPPOSITION TO REGIME: THE (ART) SHOW MUST GO
2007-03-05
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
07HAVANA252
XXXXXXXXXXXXNEED A MILLION CUBANS IN THE STREETS
2007-03-15
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
08HAVANA66
COMSEC DISCUSSES FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY WITH CUBAN
2008-01-18
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
08HAVANA168
CUBAN YOUTH CAUGHT BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR
2008-02-20
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA172
CUBAN MININT'S THOUGHTS ON TRAVEL, LAW
2009-03-17
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA278
U.S. LEGAL TEAM SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCTS WITNESS
2009-05-14
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA322
HOW MIGHT CUBA ENTER ANOTHER SPECIAL PERIOD?
2009-06-04
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA341
FROM THE MOUTH OF MINREX: POSSIBLE INSIGHT INTO
2009-06-09
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA462
OBSERVATIONS OF THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
2009-07-28
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA491
GOVERNMENT OF CUBA FRUSTRATION INCREASES OVER LACK
2009-08-11
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA559
CHECK PLEASE! GOVERNMENT OF CUBA MAY ACCEPT U.S.
2009-09-14
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
10HAVANA9
U.S.- CUBA CHILL EXAGGERATED, BUT OLD WAYS
2010-01-06
2010-12-16
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
10HAVANA84
KEY TRADING PARTNERS SEE NO BIG ECONOMIC REFORMS
2010-02-09
2010-12-16
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
05BRUSSELS1530
CUBA: EU COMMISSIONER MICHEL BOLSTERS CUBAN FONMIN
2005-04-18
2010-12-15
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brussels
06CARACAS2367
CASTRO'S ILLNESS; IMPACT ON THE BRV, ON BRV-GOC
2006-08-10
2010-12-15
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Caracas
06MADRID3095
SPAIN/CUBA: SPANISH DOCTOR CONSULTS ON CASTRO
2006-12-27
2010-12-15
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
07HAVANA5
CASTRO ALIVE FOR 48TH ANNIVERSARY OF REGIME
2007-01-03
2010-12-15
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
07HAVANA591
RAUL CASTRO'S WIFE VILMA ESPIN DIES
2007-06-19
2010-12-15
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
09HAVANA153
LAGE AND PEREZ ROQUE ADMIT "ERRORS" AND RESIGN ALL
2009-03-06
2010-12-15
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
10MADRID187
A/S VALENZUELA DISCUSSES LATIN AMERICA WITH
2010-02-18
2010-12-15
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
09VATICAN59
C) VATICAN HOPES FOR BETTER U.S.-CUBA TIES, IN PART TO REIN
2009-04-22
2010-12-10
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vatican
10VATICAN13
GREEN†POPE SUPPORTS US PATH FORWARD FROM COPENHAGEN
2010-01-21
2010-12-10
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vatican
10VATICAN14
VATICAN OFFICIAL ON CUBA RELATIONS WITH EU AND U.S.
2010-01-21
2010-12-10
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vatican
04MADRID3914
CUBA: MFA ON INVITING DISSIDENTS TO SPANISH
2004-10-07
2010-12-10
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
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